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I NTRODUCTION
Riding in like the cavalry with governm ent banner flying high,
contingency-fee lawyers have snatched the distressed “sleeping giant” 1
*

Associate Professor of Legal Writing, St. John’s University School of Law. Environmental,
Land Use and Natural Resource Department, Kirkpatrick & Lockhart, Preston Gates Ellis,
LLP (2004-2007). Environmental and Natural Resources/Litigation Departments, Dewey
Ballantine LLP (presently Dewey & LeBoeuf, LLP) (1995-2004). I thank Donald W. Stever
and B. David Naidu, Esqs., and Professors Akilah Folami, Theresa Hughes, Mary Lyndon,
Michael Simons, and Philip Weinberg for their advice. I further thank Jane Black, Frank
DiCarlo, Jason Strauss, and the Editorial Board of the William & Mary Environmental
Law and Policy Review, for their invaluable research and editing assistance.
1
Ken Stier & Mark J. Magyar, NRD: The New Battlefield in Environmental Litigation,
N.J. REP., Apr. 2004, available at http://www.njreporter.org/archive/nrd.html (quoting
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that is the public natural resource damage action.2 Hailed by some as the
saviors of an otherwise languishing public action, and encouraged by the
promise of gargantuan damage awards,3 these private attorneys have
entered into “special counsel” 4 agreements with state Attorney Generals’
offices to bring claims to compensate the public for injury, destruction or
harm caused to the public’s natural resources. 5 Under this agreement,

remarks by Richard Stewart, Professor, New York University School of Law, that “[t]his is
the sleepinggiant [sic] of environmental liability . . . .”); Peter L. Gray, The Rise of Natural
Resource Damage Claims: States and Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Leading the Charge, ENVTL.
LITIG . & TOXIC TORTS COMMITTEE NEWSLETTER (ABA), Apr. 2007, at 5 (“Natural resource
damage (NRD) actions have long been regarded as the sleeping giant of Superfund.”).
2
Natural resource damages (or “NRDs”) are defined as “injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources.” Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (“CERCLA”) § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (2000); accord CERCLA §§ 101(6),
111(b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(6), 9611(b) (2000). Natural resources are defined broadly to
include “land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water supplies,” and
similar resources. CERCLA § 101(16), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (2000). For a more detailed
discussion of CERCLA’s damage measurement , see infra Parts II.A and B.
3
For example, in early 2000, New Jersey sought $950 million in natural resource damages
from sixty-six companies alleged to have contributed to contamination in the lower Passaic
River. Marilynn R. Greenberg & Steven T. Senior, Natural Resource Damages Loom Large
in New Jersey, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNCIL, Dec. 23, 2003, at 21. See also Gerald F.
George, Litigation of Claims for Natural Resource Damages, in ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION
397, 399-400 (ALI-ABA 2000) (“[T]he most recent ‘megabuck’ natural resource damage
lawsuit to make headlines involves a $260 million suit filed by the New Mexico Office of
Natural Resource Trustee . . . .”). Loosely termed “bounty hunters,” such contingency-fee
attorneys take a substantial percentage of the overall damage recovery. See, e.g., Greenberg
& Senior, supra. One attorney retained by the State of New Jersey to pursue natural
resource damages resulting from pollution to the Passaic River “will receive at least 20%
of the first $10 million recovered, 17.5% of the next $15 million recovered and 15% of any
amount recovered over $25 million for each NRD case that is settled after the state has
initiated a lawsuit.” Id.
4
The arrangement has been alternatively referenced by such terms as “independent
counsel,” “outside counsel” and “special Attorney General.” For convenience, all titles will
be collectively referenced herein as “special counsel.”
5
Eric G. Lasker, Superfund Law Preempts Contingent-Fee Arrangements in Natural
Resource Damages Suits, LEGAL BACKGROUNDER (Wash. Legal Found., Wash., D.C.),
July 15, 2005, at 1-2.
[T]he . . . more ominous aspect of the New Mexico litigation, however,
is the State’s retention of outside counsel on a contingent fee basis to
pursue NRD [natural resource damage] claims under CERCLA and state
law theories. The willingness of plaintiffs’ class action firms to “front”
the costs of NRD litigation for states—in particular for the ubiquitous
groundwater claims—could mean that the number of state NRD claims
will explode.
George, supra note 3, at 400.
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special counsel brings a natural resource damage action on behalf of the
public and fronts the litigation costs, but deducts a percentage of the
public’s damage recovery to pay the attorney’s contingency fee; the re
mainder goes into a fund 6 to be allocated by the government’s natural
resource damage “trustee.” 7
As discussed in Part I of this article, the natural resource “giant”
was induced into its slumber because under-funded governments had
generally failed to bring these types of costly, complex claims for residual
environmental harm.8 Congress, which had otherwise structured a sound
scheme for natural resource damages in the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), failed to insert a
provision permitting recovery of litigation-related attorney’s fees and
costs. Additionally, with the passage of the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (“SARA”),9 Congress cut off the availability
of most Superfund 10 money associated with the litigation of these claims.11
Moreover, government attention was preoccupied by more pressing matters

6

See, e.g., Professional Services Contract Between the Territory of the Virgin Islands,
Department of Property & Procurement and the Law Offices of John K. Dema P.C., at
2-3 (2004).
7
As explained in greater detail in Part II.C below, CERCLA authorizes the United States
and the individual states, territories and tribes to designate an official to serve as the natural
resource “trustee” with standing to sue on behalf of the public for injuries to the natural
resources within their respective trusteeship. CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1)
(2000); 65 Fed. Reg. 6012, 6013 (Feb. 9, 2000) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11).
8
Anthony R. Chase, Remedying CERCLA’s Natural Resource Damages Provision:
Incorporation of the Public Trust Doctrine into Natural Resource Damage Action, 11 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 353, 355 (1992) (“Some critics suggest that until recently, these provisions
have ‘done little more than gather dust.’”) (quoting Erik D. Olson, Natural Resource
Damages in the Wake of the Ohio and Colorado Decisions: Where Do We Go From Here?,
19 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,551 (1989)). “Olson charges that the natural resource
damage program has not lived up to its potential primarily because federal agencies have
lacked the will, the resources or both to make the program work.” Id. at 355 n.14.
9
Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1772 (1986).
10
Congress passed CERCLA or “Superfund,” in response to a growing national concern
about the release of hazardous substances from abandoned waste sites. See, e.g., United
States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546, 548 (W.D.N.Y. 1988). CERCLA
(1) provides the necessary authority for the federal government to respond to hazardous
substance releases to remove threats to the environmental and public health; (2) creates
the “Superfund” “to finance cleanup and response efforts”; and (3) creates “a liability scheme
to ensure that those responsible” for hazardous substance releases “pay for the response
costs and for damage to natural resources.” Id. CERCLA was broadly amended in 1986
by SARA. Id. (citing SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986)).
11
See infra note 39 and accompanying text.
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relating to the remediation of stagnating hazardous waste sites.12 As a re
sult, numerous natural resource damage claims were expiring, and the in
jection of the contingency-fee arrangement into the litigation process was
recognized for its catalyzing effect on state prosecution of such actions.13
But is the current trend of outsourcing the public’s natural resource
damage action to private lawyers the correct solution to fill CERCLA’s
funding void? The arrangement has been criticized for improperly diverting
millions of dollars that should lawfully have gone toward public natural
resource restoration to pay an attorney’s fee.14
In Part II, this article explores the complex structure of and restor
ative purpose underlying, CERCLA’s natural resource damage provisions.15
The author concludes that such contingency-fee arrangements violate the
express language of, and legislative intent underlying, CERCLA, which
limits a trustees ability to “use [a natural resource damage award] only
to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of [the damaged] natural
resource” (“use restriction”). 16 Moreover, because broad state, territorial
and common laws that permit recovery for natural resource damages are
often raised in addition to, or in place of, a federal CERCLA damage
claim,17 there is a corollary issue regarding the legality of paying a con
tingency fee from one of those broader laws that typically do not contain
use restrictions. The author posits, however, that because Congress did not
include litigation-related attorney’s fees in the natural resource damage
measurement, and because Congress intended that the recovery serve as
a “make whole” restorative remedy, CERCLA’s comprehensive natural
resource damage regime would be undermined if a damage recovery is

12

See Kevin R. Murray et al., Natural Resource Damage Trustees: Whose Side Are They
Really On? 5 ENVTL. L. 407, 414 (1999) (“Since CERCLA was enacted . . . the predominant
emphasis of the act has been on the government’s ability to clean up a site and hold PRPs
strictly liable for the government’s response costs.”) (citing Lloyd W. Landreth & Kevin M.
Ward, Natural Resource Damages: Recovery Under State Law Compared with Federal
Laws, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,134, 10,134 (Apr. 1990)).
13
See, e.g., George, supra note 3, at 400; Gray, supra note 1, at 3.
14
See George, supra note 3, at 400; Lasker, supra note 5, at 1-2.
15
This article is limited to addressing the interplay between contingency-fee representation
in natural resource damage lawsuits, the express language and underlying purpose of
CERCLA, and attendant public policy issues. This article does not address whether par
allel arguments can be advanced under natural resource damage provisions contained
in the Oil Pollution Act, §§ 1001, et seq., 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701, et seq., or the Clean Water Act,
§§ 101, et seq., 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251, et seq.
16
CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000).
17
See infra note 140.

2007]

I LLEGALITY OF C ONTINGENCY -F EE A RRANGEMENTS

173

depleted by paying a contingency fee under the authority of such broad
state, territorial or common laws. Congress carefully crafted CERCLA’s
natural resource damage regulations to ensure that the damage award
would be sufficient to accomplish, and would in fact apply toward, resource
restoration; CERCLA preempts state, territorial, or common natural re
source damage laws that conflict with this objective.18
Having concluded that such an arrangement is illegal under
CERCLA as currently structured, yet recognizing that CERCLA is flawed
because it fails to provide the appropriate financial incentives to facilitate
government efforts to bring natural resource damage claims, in Part III
the author proposes legislative reform to permit the recovery of the gov
ernment’s reasonable litigation-related fees and costs when prosecuting
CERCLA natural resource damage actions. Such reform will enable gov
ernments to bring natural resource damage claims and to lawfully recoup
the litigation costs from the natural resource damage award.
Because CERCLA’s present scheme does not permit payment of
most attorney’s fees,19 however, the current use of contingency-fee attorneys
to prosecute such actions must cease. Pending reform, natural resource
damage actions must be prosecuted by either salaried government counsel
or, alternatively, special counsel paid a comparable salary or a reasonable
fee drawn from a lawful government appropriation.
I.

T HE R ISE OF C ONTINGENCY -F EE R EPRESENTATION U NDER
CERCLA

The government’s ability to recover damages for harm to the
public’s natural resources finds its genesis in the common law. 20 Prior to

18

See infra Part II.D.
This article distinguishes between a limited class of “assessment-related attorney’s fees,”
described infra in Part II.A.3, which are included in CERCLA’s natural resource damage
measurement, and “litigation-related attorney’s fees,” which are not included in CERCLA’s
natural resource damage measurement. The author posits that assessment-related
attorney’s fees are recoverable, while litigation-related attorney’s fees are not.
20
John Carlucci, Natural Resource Damages at Contaminated Sites, 13 NAT. RESOURCES
& ENV’T 473, 473 (1999) (“The notion that governmental entities are entitled to recover
damages for injuries to natural resources is rooted in common law.”); Terry Fox, Natural
Resource Damages: The New Frontier of Environmental Litigation, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 521,
536 (1993) (“The common law public trust doctrine paved the way for the evolution of
federally based protections of natural resources.”); Judith Robinson, Note, The Role of
Nonuse Values in Natural Resource Damages: Past, Present, and Future, 75 TEX. L. REV.
189, 190 (1996) (“The ability of the government to collect damages for public resources
19
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CERCLA’s enactment, litigants were forced to contend with what was
generally understood to be ineffective common law remedies for residual
harm to environmental natural resources.21 Among other failings, the com
mon law damage measurement was deemed inadequate to compensate
for residual injury to natural resources.22
CERCLA was enacted in 1980,23 partially as a response to these
recognized shortcomings in traditional common law remedies.24 CERCLA’s
central goal, however, was “to initiate and establish a comprehensive re
sponse and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems
associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.”25
As such, CERCLA was primarily designed to identify and remediate haz
ardous waste sites and impose the costs of the cleanup on the potentially
responsible parties (“PRPs”).26
CERCLA also includes the lesser known natural resource damage
scheme that is the focus of this article. CERCLA’s natural resource damage

has its roots in the common-law public trust doctrine, which provided the basis for the
natural resource damage provisions in CERCLA . . . .”).
21
See Carlucci, supra note 20, at 473 (“Over time, limitations inherent in various common
law doctrines underscored the need for a more formalized acknowledgment of natural re
source damage (NRD) claims.”).
22
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 96-848 at 13-14 (1980) (stating that “traditional tort law presents
substantial barriers to recovery” and that “compensation ultimately provided to injured
parties is generally inadequate”); H.R. REP. NO. 96-172, pt. 1, at 17 (1979) (“[C]ommon law
remedies [are] . . . inadequate to compensate victims in a fair and expeditious manner.”).
See generally Fox, supra note 20, at 536-37 (“While the common law public trust doctrine
provides a useful and necessary basis for natural resource damage recovery, future natural
resource damage claims will probably be pursued under federal statutes because they
clearly provide a broader statutory basis for the recovery of natural resource damages.”).
23
Pub. L. No. 95-510, 94 Stat. 2762 (1980).
24
Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 455 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (“The legislative his
tory illustrates . . . that a motivating force behind the CERCLA natural resource damage
provisions was Congress’ dissatisfaction with the common law.”); see also infra Part II.C.
25
United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1570 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
96-1016, pt. 1, at 22 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120). Accord United
States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998) (“CERCLA was enacted in response to the
serious environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution.”).
26
Meghrig v. KFC Western, Inc., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996) (CERCLA was “principally de
signed to effectuate the cleanup of toxic waste sites [and] to compensate those who have
attended to the remediation of environmental hazards.”). CERCLA defines four categories
of PRPs: (1) current “owner[s] and operator[s] of a vessel or a facility”; (2) former owners
or operators at the time of a hazardous substance disposal; (3) anyone who “arranged for
disposal or treatment”; and (4) anyone who “accepted any hazardous substances for trans
port to disposal or treatment facilities . . . from which there is a release.” CERCLA § 107(a),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).
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provisions are designed to compensate the public for residual injury,27
understood as the difference between a natural resource in its baseline
condition and the resource after remediation.28 Under this damage scheme,
CERCLA imposes liability upon PRPs for “damages for injury to, destruc
tion of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assess
ing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.” 29 This
damage measurement compensates for “natural resource injuries that are
not fully remedied by response actions as well as public economic values
lost from the date of the discharge or release until the resources have
fully recovered.” 30
Within this damage scheme, CERCLA provides a mechanism for
states, territories and tribes to designate an official natural resource
“trustee,” and gives the trustee legal standing to seek natural resource
damages on behalf of the public.31 As the statutorily-authorized represen
tative of the public’s natural resources, the trustee “shall act on behalf of
the public” 32 with respect to the resources under the trusteeship.
CERCLA was designed to resolve environmental liability by encour
aging settlement.33 The government can settle natural resource damage

27

CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 52749 (Oct. 19, 1994). “Baseline”
conditions are those “that would have existed . . . had the discharge of oil or release of the
hazardous substance under investigation not occurred.” 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(e) (2006).
[N]atural resource damages settlements follow or are contemporaneous
with cleanup settlements. This is so because, customarily, natural
resource damages are viewed as the difference between the natural
resource in its pristine condition and the natural resource after the
cleanup, together with the lost use value and the costs of assessment.
In re Acushnet River & New Bedford Harbor, 712 F. Supp. 1019, 1035 (D. Mass. 1989).
29
CERCLA § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
30
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,749, 52,749 (Oct. 19, 1994).
31
CERCLA § 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2000).
[SARA] created a mechanism for states to appoint natural resource
trustees to bring lawsuits seeking natural resource damages. . . . In
SARA, Congress provided an express means for states to bring natural
resource damage actions by permitting the states to designate ‘natural
resource trustees.’ . . . The amended legislation regularizes the pro
cedure by which states may identify those with responsibility to protect
their natural resources directly through natural resource damages claims.
Town of Bedford v. Raytheon Co., 755 F. Supp. 469, 472-73 (D. Mass. 1991). Natural re
source damage trustees are designated by, respectively, the President and the Governors
of the State or Territory. CERCLA § 107(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2).
32
CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
33
See, e.g., United States v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., No. 2002/1488, 2006 WL 3331220, at *3
28
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liability and grant a settling party a “covenant not to sue” 34 for future
natural resource damages if the potentially responsible party agrees “to
undertake appropriate actions necessary to protect and restore the natural
resources damaged by [the] release or threatened release of hazardous
substances.” 35
Although CERCLA established a goliath of a natural resource
damage scheme, few claims were brought.36 Initially after CERCLA’s
enactment, governments concentrated on remedying priority sites and
used CERCLA’s cost recovery provisions to recover the costs expended on
those efforts.37 This approach was in large measure an artifact of necessity
because the regulatory authorities were faced with an urgent threat to
human health and the environment caused by a large number of unad
dressed hazardous waste sites.38
Another factor contributing to the lack of natural resource damage
claims is Congress’s failure to insert a provision permitting recovery of the

(E.D. Mo. 2006) (noting “CERCLA’s objective of encouraging settlement”); United States
v. Fort James Operating Co., 313 F. Supp. 2d 902, 909 (E.D. Wis. 2004).
34
CERCLA § 122(j)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(j)(2) (2000).
35
Id.
36
See Gray, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that in the years since Superfund was enacted,
“there have been only a handful of reported NRD cases brought by the United States.
Likewise, until the mid- to late-1990s, state prosecution of NRD claims were equally rare.”);
Greenberg & Senior, supra note 3 (“For years these claims . . . have been called the
‘sleeping giant.’ [The New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection] recently trans
formed this sleeping giant into an 800-pound gorilla.”); Stier & Magyar, supra note 1
(quoting remarks by Richard Stewart, Professor, New York University School of Law, that
“[t]his is the sleepinggiant [sic] of environmental liability . . . .”); John Tomlin, Waking
the Sleeping Giant: Analyzing New Jersey’s Pursuit of Natural Resource Damages from
Responsible Polluting Parties in the Lower Passaic River, 23 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 235
(2006) (citing 5 MICHAEL B. GERRARD, ED., ENVTL. L. PRAC. GUIDE § 31.04A (2004).
37
Murray et al., supra note 12, at 414 (“Since CERCLA was enacted . . . , the predominant
emphasis of the act has been on the government’s ability to clean up a site and hold PRPs
strictly liable for the government’s response costs.”) (citing Lloyd W. Landreth & Kevin M.
Ward, Natural Resource Damages: Recovery Under State Law Compared with Federal
Laws, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,134, 10,134 (Apr. 1990)).
38
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 880 (9th Cir. 2001) (“CERCLA
was a response by Congress to the threat to public health and the environment posed by
the widespread use and disposal of hazardous substances.”) (quoting Pinal Creek Group
v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir. 1997)); see also Colorado v. U.S.
Dep’t of the Army, 707 F. Supp. 1562, 1567 (D. Colo. 1989) (“CERCLA was enacted to clean
up inactive hazardous waste disposal sites. It established ‘a comprehensive response and
financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned
and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.’”) (quoting United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605
F. Supp. 1064, 1071 (D. Colo. 1985)).
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government’s reasonable litigation-related attorney’s fees. When Congress
passed SARA in 1986, it also eliminated the availability of most Superfund
money associated with the litigation of these claims.39 The complex and
costly nature of the natural resource damage action, however, taxed the
resources of under-funded and understaffed Attorneys General offices and
trustees. 40 The costs involved with prosecuting such actions, particularly
the costs associated with performing an assessment of the natural re
source injury, have been criticized as prohibitively high.41 Some commen
tators have noted that, “because [NRD] trustees are not permitted to use
Superfund resources for NRD assessments, trustees are left to finance
their own costs, which may amount to millions of dollars. Due to a lack of
budgetary funding, this obstacle may be insurmountable for some govern
ment agencies.” 42 Consequently, the natural resource damage provisions
were largely overlooked and, neglected, the natural resource damage
“giant” laid down to sleep.43

39

Chase, supra note 8, at 355 (“Yet despite such an apparently sound statutory framework
and broad reach, CERCLA’s damage provisions have failed to fulfill their promise.”). The
enactment of SARA in 1986 effectively “cut off the availability of Superfund money for res
toration of injured natural resources.” Ohio v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 445
n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1989). See also 26 U.S.C. § 9507(c)(1)(A)(ii) (2000); CERCLA §111(c)(1)-(2),
42 U.S.C. § 9611(c)(1)-(2) (2000). The trustee is barred from obtaining funds until it has
first “exhausted all administrative and judicial remedies to recover the amount of such
claim from persons who may be liable” under § 107 as PRPs. Id. at § 111(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9611(b)(2)(A).
40
ASS’N OF STATE & TERRITORIAL SOLID WASTE MGMT. OFFICIALS, SURVEY OF STATE
REMEDIAL PROGRAM ACTIVITIES IN NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGES 2 (1997) (noting that most
state natural resource damage programs have been in the developmental stages, con
strained by limited staffing and funding, as well as inadequate coordination with neighbor
ing state and federal natural resource damage programs); E. Lynn Grayson & Sarah H.
Halpin, What Businesses Need to Know About Natural Resource Damage Claims, 12 BUS.
L. TODAY, Nov.-Dec. 2000, at 16, 17 (“Natural resource damage cases historically seemed
almost too burdensome for underfunded federal and state trustees lacking in resources
and litigation support.”).
41
See Grayson & Halpin, supra note 40, at 18-19.
42
Murray et al., supra note 12, at 427-28. See also James A. Chalmers & Suzanne M.
Stuckwisch, Recent Developments in Natural Resource Damage Claims: Smoke or Fire?
15 ENVTL. COMPLIANCE & LITIG . STRATEGY, Mar. 2000, at 1 (“The relatively small number
of NRD actions filed is a direct consequence, therefore, of the fact that the trustees carry
a heavy burden in case development, combined with very limited budgets. At the federal
level, NOAA and DOI have together typically only had $20 million to $30 million annually
with which to pursue NRD actions, and most state trustees have had correspondingly low,
or no, budgets for these purposes.”).
43
See supra notes 1, 36.
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After a lengthy period of hibernation, trustees are focusing renewed
effort on prosecuting natural resource damage claims. 44 This trend is at
least partly attributable to the willingness of contingency-fee attorneys
to fund and power the litigation.45 For example, in the Professional Service
Contract between the Territory of the Virgin Islands, Department of
Property & Procurement, and special counsel John K. Dema, P.C., the
parties provide:
WHEREAS, the Government . . . does not presently
have the funding to advance expenses and currently pay
the customary charges of the skilled counsel involved; and
WHEREAS, it is acknowledged by the Attorney
General that the prosecution of natural resource damage
and penalties claims involves many novel and difficult
questions of proof and law, all of which further add to the
uncertainty of a successful outcome and, therefore, the cer
tainty of compensation under a contingent fee agreement.46
44

Lasker, supra note 5, at 1; see also Murray et al., supra note 12, at 414 (“After . . . years
of environmental regulation under CERCLA, government agencies are looking beyond
remediation and paying ‘increased attention to another component of CERCLA liability’—
NRDs.”) (quoting Lloyd W. Landreth & Kevin M. Ward, Natural Resource Damages:
Recovery Under State Law Compared With Federal Laws, 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,134, 10,134 (1990)).
45
See Gray, supra note 1, at 3 (“One reason for New Jersey’s willingness to bring so many
NRD claims [i.e., over three dozen filed since 2000] may be its decision to use private
lawyers to pursue these claims on a contingent fee basis, and thereby minimize its cost
to litigate these claims.”); Allan Kanner & Tibor Nagy, The Use of Contingency Fees in
Natural Resource Damage and Other Parens Patriae Cases, 19 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) NO. 32,
at 745 (2004) (“Recently, many state and tribal governments have hired private attorneys
on a contingent fee basis to prosecute natural resource damage (NRD) claims against
polluters . . . . The enormous costs and risks associated with prosecuting these claims
combined with limited budgets for such initiatives has fueled this trend . . . .”). Allan
Kanner and Associates was special counsel to the State of New Jersey and the Quapaw
Nation in their NRD suits. Id. at 745 n.3.
46
Professional Services Contract Between the Territory of the Virgin Islands, Department
of Property & Procurement and the Law Offices of John K. Dema, P.C. at 2 (2004). New
Mexico has a similar arrangement with special counsel. See also State of New Mexico
Professional Services Contract for Natural Resource Damage Claim Litigation (June 1999)
(“The Office of Attorney General is the legal counsel and representative of the Office of the
Natural Resources Trustee and the Natural Resources Trustee, Dr. William M. Turner . . . ,
but it is without adequate financial and personnel resources to pursue such litigation with
out retaining private attorneys who are willing to risk their time, energy and financial
assets in pursuit of such litigation against responsible parties.”). Law firms seeking these
types of contingency-fee arrangements use these arguments to market their services. See,
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The contingency-fee special counsel arrangement invigorated the
government’s ability to bring natural resource damage claims. Critics,
however, charge that the contingency-fee arrangement between these gov
ernments and their special counsel violates the express language of, legis
lative intent underlying, and tightly-knit statutory scheme of, CERCLA.47
In particular, the arrangement violates the use restriction contained in
Section 107(f)(1) of CERCLA, which mandates that “[s]ums recovered by
the . . . trustee under this subsection shall be retained by the trustee,
without further appropriation, for use only to restore, replace, or acquire
the equivalent of such natural resource.” 48 The argument is that the
trustee may only deduct certain statutorily-permissible types of costs—
not including litigation-related attorney’s fees 49—from a natural resource
damage recovery, at which point the remainder becomes a public fund to
be safeguarded by the trustee and only used in a manner consistent with
CERCLA’s use restriction.50 Because contingency-fee agreements contem
plate diverting a significant percentage of a damage recovery to pay the
attorney’s fee, the contingency-fee arrangement has been criticized for
illegally depleting the public’s damage recovery in violation of CERCLA’s
use restriction.51
Opponents further argue that once the public’s recovery is drained
by the payment of the contingency fee, the fund is impoverished to the
point where the remainder may be insufficient to fund projects that would
restore the injured natural resources.52 As a result, actual restoration of

e.g., Above and Beyond Natural Resources Damage, DISCLOSURE (Richardson Patrick
Westbrook & Brickman, LLC), Summer 2006, at 2 (“In these days of budget shortfalls, . . .
local governments lack the resources and expertise to pursue these complex and novel
[NRD] claims. RPWB is helping to fill that important need.”).
47
See generally Gray, supra note 1; Lasker, supra note 5.
48
CERCLA §107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C.§ 9607(f)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
49
But, as discussed in Parts II.A and B below, this does include a narrow class of
assessment-related attorney’s fees. The contingency fee is not justified by CERCLA’s
allowance of assessment-related attorney’s fees.
50
See generally Lasker, supra note 5.
51
See id. at 2.
52
Id. at 4 (“To the extent that any portion of an NRD recovery is used for payment of
private attorneys, the remaining NRD recovery would by definition be insufficient to restore
the injured natural resources.”). The author recognizes that because CERCLA’s natural
resource damage measurement includes values above restoration (i.e., interim loss of use
and reasonable costs of assessment), see CERCLA §§ 107(a)(4)(C), 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§
9607(a)(4)(C), 9607(f)(1) (2000), there may theoretically be recoveries that can account for
a contingency fee while still funding restoration activities. However, the underlying point
that the damage recovery may be insufficient stands, as does the argument that Congress
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the injured natural resource may not be accomplished.53 And, even if cer
tain restoration projects are funded as a result of this special counsel
arrangement, the public did not receive the totality of the funding to which
it was entitled because the trust fund was depleted by the payment of the
attorney’s fee.54 On policy grounds, opponents charge that such arrange
ments thwart non-monetary restorative settlements, grant attorneys an
impermissible stake in the outcome of the litigation, and create a situation
where governments improperly use the remaining damage pool as general
treasury funds because the pool is no longer sufficient to fund full resto
ration of the resource.55
Conversely, those seeking to justify the contingency fee argue that
the arrangement serves the important public benefit of facilitating the
government’s ability to bring actions that might otherwise have expired
because governments would not have the funds or staff to pursue natural
resource damage claims. 56 Without the assistance of special counsel,
natural resource damage claims would not be prosecuted by counsel com
petent to handle the scientific complexity of a natural resource damage
action,57 or would expire under the applicable statute of limitations.58
Advocates liken the arrangement to the tobacco context,59 where
the legality of similar arrangements between special contingency-fee
counsel and state Attorney Generals’ offices were challenged and mostly
upheld.60 Using traditional public trust law arguments, those in support

intended that the public would receive the full benefit of an undepleted damage recovery.
53
Lasker, supra note 5, at 4.
54
See id.
55
See, e.g., Motion to Intervene in Motion by Dean C. Plaskett, Trustee for Natural
Resources of the Territory of the Virgin Islands, to Disburse Natural Resource Damage
Settlement Monies to Acquire Property, Comm’r of the Dep’t of Planning & Natural Res.,
Dean C. Plaskett v. Esso Standard Oil, S.A., No. 1:98-cv-00206 (D.V.I. July 30, 2004);
Gray, supra note 1, at 6-8.
56
See, e.g., Kanner & Nagy, supra note 45 (citing “the enormous costs and risks asso
ciated with prosecuting these claims combined with limited budgets for such initiatives”
as justification for contingency fees).
57
See id.
58
See Transcript of Hearing, N.J. Soc’y for Envtl. & Econ. Dev. v. Campbell (NJ SEED),
No. 343-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 18, 2004) (Sabatino, J.), reprinted in William H. Hyatt, Jr.
et al., Natural Resource Damages: New Developments at the State Level, in HAZARDOUS
SUBSTANCES, SITE REMEDIATION, AND ENFORCEMENT 281, 365 ex.E (ALI-ABA, 2005).
(“[T]here could indeed be as many as 4,000 sites throughout the state [of New Jersey]
that are affected by a looming statute of limitations . . . .”).
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Glendening, 709 A.2d 1230 (Md. 1998); San Francisco v.
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of the arrangement argue that a trustee can withdraw the reasonable costs
incurred to create or protect the trust corpus.61 They further argue that the
contingency fee constitutes a cost-effective method of pursuing such actions
and is monetarily more appropriate than hourly billing methods.62
To date, this has barely been discussed beyond a select group of
specialty practitioners, and efforts to raise the issue have been sparse, at
best.63 Presently, numerous states, territories and tribes of record have re
tained special counsel on a contingency-fee basis to handle public natural
resource damage litigation.64
Because millions of public trust fund dollars earmarked for re
source restoration are at stake, the issue of whether a contingency fee

Philip Morris, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1130, 1134 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (upholding validity of
contingency-fee contract in tobacco litigation).
61
Kanner & Nagy, supra note 45, at 746-47.
62
Id. at 748-49.
63
See generally Defendant United States’ Motion to Strike Demand For Attorney’s Fees
at 11, New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., No. 99-1118 (D.N.M. June 5, 2004) (arguing that
contingency-fee representation is impermissible for natural resource damage actions under
the plain language of CERCLA’s use restriction and the “American Rule” prohibiting
recovery of attorney’s fees absent an express legislative provision permitting recovery of
such fees); Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Regarding Federal Preemption
of Territorial Law Regarding Use of Natural Resource Damage Recovery, Comm’r of the
Dep’t of Planning & Natural Res., Dean C. Plaskett v. Esso Standard Oil, S.A., No. 1:98
cv-00206206 (D.V.I. Feb. 14, 2005) (arguing that CERCLA’s use restriction constitutes
the only permissible uses of natural resource damage recoveries by a trustee and the use
restriction preempts conflicting state, territorial or common laws). Neither court decided
the merit of these issues. In Esso Standard Oil, the trustee withdrew his application to
divert natural resource trust funds after the United States intervened and filed its
amicus brief objecting to the trustee’s action, thus, mooting the issue. Notice of
Withdrawal of Plaintiff’s Motion to Provide Information to Court Regarding the Proposed
Disbursement of Settlement Monies, and Withdrawal of Plaintiff’s Appeal of the October
8, 2004, Order Granting Motion of Britain H. Bryant to Intervene by Plaintiff, No. 1:98
cv-00206 (D.V.I. Mar. 1, 2005). In New Mexico v. General Electric Co., the court never
decided the contingency fee issue because it initially reserved judgment on the matter
and the federal defendants were subsequently dismissed from the action. Order Regarding
Matters Heard July 27, 2000 at ¶4, New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., Civ. No. 99-1118 (D.N.M.
July 27, 2000). See also Hyatt Jr. et al., supra note 58, at 292-93.
64
Gray, supra note 1, at 3 (naming special counsel in the United States Virgin Islands, New
Jersey and New Mexico); Kanner & Nagy, supra note 45, at 745 (demonstrating that, for
example, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, the United States Virgin Islands and
the Sovereign Nations of the Quapaw and the Coeur d’Alene have retained special counsel
on contingency to handle natural resource damage actions); see also Esso Standard Oil,
S.A., No. 1:98-cv-00206 (D.V.I. 1998) (retention of special counsel on contingency to assist
the government of the Virgin Islands).
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may lawfully be drawn from a natural resource damage recovery compels
judicial review.
II.

T HE I LLEGALITY OF C ONTINGENCY -F EE R EPRESENTATION W HEN
P ROSECUTING P UBLIC N ATURAL R ESOURCE D AMAGE A CTIONS

A.
CERCLA’s Express Statutory and Regulatory Language
The first step in evaluating the legality of contingency-fee
representation in the context of natural resource damage claims prose
cution is to determine whether there is anything in the text of CERCLA
or its implementing regulations that directly addresses the government’s
ability to recover attorney’s fees. “[W]hen a statute speaks with clarity
to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s meaning, in all but the most
extraordinary circumstance, is finished.” 65 Thus, where there is unambig
uous statutory language, it must be presumed that “the legislative purpose
is expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.” 66
As discussed below, three types of CERCLA provisions are germane
to the issue of attorney’s fee recovery. First, in four other provisions of
CERCLA, Congress expressly provided for litigation-related attorney’s fee
recovery, but did not do so in the provisions relating to natural resource
damage actions. Second, CERCLA’s natural resource damage provisions
contain the use restriction governing the “only” 67 permissible uses by the
trustee of the damage recovery. Third, CERCLA provides for recovery of
certain other types of costs associated with natural resource damage
actions, including the “reasonable costs of assess[ment],” but does not pro
vide for litigation-related attorney’s fee recovery.68 Each of these CERCLA
components is addressed below.
1.

CERCLA Provisions Permitting Attorney’s Fee Recovery

Congress provided for litigation-related attorney’s fee recovery in
four provisions of CERCLA. First, in CERCLA’s citizen suit provision, a
substantially prevailing party in a civil action who demonstrated that

65

Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) (citing Demarest v.
Manspeaker, 498 U.S. 184, 190 (1991)).
66
Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11 (1962).
67
CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000) (“Sums recovered by a State as trustee
under this subsection shall be available for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the
equivalent of such natural resources by the State.”) (emphasis added).
68
Id. § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C).
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there was a violation of, or that the President or another officer failed
to perform a non-discretionary duty under, CERCLA, may be awarded
court-discretionary “costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees).” 69 Second, under CERCLA’s abatement action
section, a party who was erroneously ordered to pay response costs may,
in a court’s discretion, be awarded “appropriate costs, fees, and other ex
penses in accordance with subsections (a) and (d) of section 2412 of title
28.” 70 Section 2412(d)(2)(a) of title 28 specifically includes “reasonable
attorney fees” in the definition of “fees and other expenses.”71 Third, under
CERCLA’s employee whistleblower protection provision, an applicant who
has demonstrated in an administrative hearing that he has been subjected
to discriminatory workplace treatment because he disclosed a statutory
violation that resulted in an order to abate may request “a sum equal to the
aggregate amount of all costs and expenses (including the attorney’s fees)
determined by the Secretary of Labor to have been reasonably incurred.”72
Finally, in a government response cost enforcement actions, PRPs
are liable to the government for response costs,73 and Congress altered
the term “response” with SARA to “include enforcement activities related
thereto.”74 While this provision does not reference attorney’s fees as clearly
as the other three above-referenced provisions, courts concur that the
government may seek litigation-related attorney’s fees and costs asso
ciated with a response cost enforcement action because of the statutory
language permitting recovery for “enforcement activities.” 75
Conversely, Congress drafted no such parallel provision for
litigation-related attorney’s fees in CERCLA’s natural resource damage
provisions. Liability is for “damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources, including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury,

69

Id. § 310(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f); see also briefs cited supra note 63.
Id. § 106(b)(2)(E), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(b)(2)(E).
71
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A) (2000).
72
CERCLA § 110(c), 42 U.S.C. § 9610(c) (2000).
73
Id. § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4).
74
SARA, Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 101(e), 100 Stat. 1613, 1615 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601(25) (2000)).
75
See, e.g., United States v. Dico, Inc., 266 F.3d 864, 878 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding govern
ment entitled to recovery attorney’s fees in response cost action because “the language of
the statute provides that attorney fees are recoverable as response costs under CERCLA.”);
United States v. Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 2d 105, 106 (D.R.I. 2004)
(“[C]ourts have held that, as part of its recovery of response costs, the government may
seek reimbursement for attorney’s fees because they are ‘costs of removal’ under 42
U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A). . . . [T]he terms response, removal, and remedial action ‘include
enforcement activities related thereto . . . .’”).

70
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destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.” 76 While the natural
resource damage assessment regulations include “[a]dministrative costs
and expenses necessary for, and incidental to, the assessment, assessment
planning, and restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition
of equivalent resources” planned or undertaken,77 there is no similar pro
vision for litigation-related attorney’s fees.
The fact that Congress provided for litigation-related attorney’s
fee recovery in four other CERCLA provisions, but did not similarly pro
vide for attorney’s fee recovery for natural resource damages, reflects that
Congress excluded litigation-related attorney’s fee recovery.78
Because CERCLA does not expressly provide for attorney’s fees for
natural resource damage actions, under what has come to be known as
the “American Rule,” 79 attorney’s fees are not recoverable. As discussed
in Alyeska Pipeline Services v. Wilderness Society, absent explicit statutory
authorization, under the American Rule, a prevailing party in litigation is
not entitled to recover attorney’s fees as costs or otherwise.80 In Alyeska,
the Supreme Court addressed whether environmental groups which sued
to bar construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline were entitled to an award
of attorney’s fees. Based on the American Rule, the Supreme Court
76

CERCLA § 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. §9607(a)(4)(c).
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11.15 (2006).
78
Congress well knows how to make explicit whether federal courts have
authority to award attorney’s fees, as ERISA’s fee-shifting provision
demonstrates. . . . Indeed, it is the domain of Congress to determine the
circumstances under which attorney’s fees are to be awarded . . . . When
Congress has provided the remedies for a cause of action and the act does
not explicitly provide for attorney’s fees, courts are not to imply them.
First Trust Corp. v. Bryant, 410 F.3d 842, 856 n.11 (6th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). See,
e.g., Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Liebowitz, 730 F.2d 905, 908 (N.Y. 1984) (rejecting attorney’s
fee award for a non-final civil RICO claim, reasoning “when [Congress] desired to permit
attorney’s fees to be awarded to a plaintiff . . ., it knew how to say so”). Even if the expla
nation for the absence of a fee-shifting provision for litigation-related attorney’s fees is
attributed to congressional oversight, a court should not attempt to resolve this statutory
deficiency by reading a right to such attorney’s fees into CERCLA as presently structured.
As shown herein, CERCLA’s natural resource damage scheme is so tightly knit that the
withdrawal of a fee would impermissibly drain the resulting pool of funds.
79
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 245 (1975) (superseded
by statute, Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Award Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-599, 20 Stat.
2641, as recognized in Perez v. Rodriquez Bou, 575 F.2d 21, 24 (1978)); First Trust, 410
F.3d at 856 n.11 (“[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that in the United States the
prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect attorney’s fees under our so-called
‘American Rule.’”).
80
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 245; see also Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 814
(1994).
77
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rejected the argument that litigants who seek to enforce important public
policy legislation as “private attorney[s] general” 81 are entitled to recover
attorney’s fees:
It is true that under some, if not most, of the statutes pro
viding for the allowance of reasonable fees, Congress has
opted to rely heavily on private enforcement to implement
public policy and to allow counsel fees so as to encourage
private litigation. . . . But congressional utilization of the
private-attorney-general concept can in no sense be con
strued as a grant of authority to the Judiciary to jettison
the traditional rule against nonstatutory allowances to the
prevailing party and to award attorneys’ fees whenever
the courts deem the public policy furthered by a particular
statute important enough to warrant the award.82
Congress provided for litigation-related attorney’s fees in other
provisions of CERCLA, but did not similarly provide for such fees when
prosecuting a natural resource damage action. Under the “American Rule,”

81

Although Alyeska involved a different “private attorney general” situation (i.e., a private
environmental group voluntarily undertook legal action) than the situation that is the focus
of this article (i.e., contingency-fee attorneys entering into official Professional Service
agreements with the Attorney General’s office prior to initiating legal action), the Court’s
analysis addressing when attorney’s fees have statutorily been shifted applies with equal
force to the situation at hand.
82
Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 263. The Court also stated that “[u]nder this scheme of things, it is
apparent that the circumstances under which attorneys’ fees are to be awarded and the
range of discretion of the courts in making those awards are matters for Congress to
determine.” Id. at 262. In Key Tronic Corp., the Supreme Court also held that private
parties were not entitled to most types of attorney’s fees when bringing a CERCLA cost
recovery action because, under the American Rule,
attorney’s fees generally are not a recoverable cost of litigation ‘absent
explicit congressional authorization.’ Recognition of the availability of
attorney’s fees therefore requires a determination that ‘Congress intended
to set aside this longstanding American [R]ule of law.’ Neither CERCLA
§ 107, the liabilities and defenses provision, nor § 113, which authorizes
contribution claims, expressly mentions the recovery of attorney’s fees.
511 U.S. at 814-15 (citations omitted). An important factor underpinning the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Key Tronic is that, when Congress amended CERCLA through SARA
in 1986, Congress added a provision that included an award of attorney fees in other sec
tions of CERCLA, but did not do so in the context of the private party cost recovery action
at issue in that case. The Court found that “[t]hese omissions strongly suggest a deliberate
decision not to authorize such awards.” Id. at 818-19.
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because Congress did not statutorily provide for attorney’s fee recovery,
such fees are not recoverable.
2.

CERCLA’s Use Restriction

CERCLA contains the following use restriction: “[s]ums recovered
by the . . . trustee under this subsection shall be retained by the trustee,
without further appropriation, for use only to restore, replace, or acquire
the equivalent of such natural resources.”83 A straightforward interpretation
of CERCLA’s use restriction is that a trustee may only apply a natural re
source recovery for one of the three purposes in CERCLA’s use restriction:
restoration, replacement, and acquisition of an equivalent resource.84 A
logical corollary to that straightforward interpretation, then, is that use
of a natural resource recovery to pay an attorney’s fee, which is not one
of the three permissible uses, is a violation of CERCLA’s use restriction.
3.

Reasonable Costs of Assessment

CERCLA and its implementing regulations permit the government
to recover other types of costs associated with natural resource damage
actions. Section 107(a)(4)(C) makes a PRP liable for “damages for injury to,
destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including the reasonable costs
of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from such a release.”85
The Department of the Interior (“DOI”) is the designated adminis
trative agency charged with promulgating “regulations for assess[ment] of
natural resource damages resulting from a . . . release of a hazardous sub
stance under [CERCLA].”86 The DOI regulations governing the assessment
of natural resource damages 87 define “assessment” or “natural resource
damage assessment” as “the process of collecting, compiling, and analyzing
information, statistics, or data through prescribed methodologies to

83

CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
Id.
85
Id. § 107(a)(4)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (emphasis added).
86
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 52749 (Oct. 19, 1994).
87
43 C.F.R. pt. 11 governs the assessment of damages to natural resources under CERCLA.
It supplements 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (the regulations governing the National Oil and Hazardous
Substances Pollution Contingency Plan, or “NCP”), and it provides “standardized and
cost-effective procedures for assessing natural resource damages,” which, if followed by
the trustee, are “accorded the evidentiary status of a rebuttable presumption” of validity.
43 C.F.R. § 11.11 (2006).
84
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determine damages for injuries to natural resources . . . .” 88 “Reasonable
cost,” moreover, “means the amount that may be recovered for the cost
of performing a damage assessment.” 89 “Damages means the amount of
money sought by the natural resource trustee as compensation for injury,
destruction, or loss of natural resources as set forth in section 107(a) or
111(b) of CERCLA.” 90 Finally, in section 11.15, entitled “What [D]amages
[M]ay a [T]rustee [R]ecover,” DOI specified particular categories of recov
erable costs when a trustee pursues natural resource damage actions.91
These categories include the reasonable “[a]dministrative costs and ex
penses necessary for, and incidental to, the assessment, assessment
planning, and restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acquisition
of equivalent resources planning, and any restoration, rehabilitation,
replacement, and/or acquisition of equivalent resources undertaken.” 92

88

43 C.F.R. § 11.14(aa).
Id. § 11.14(ee).
90
Id. § 11.14(l). Nowhere in the separate definitions of “injury,” “destruction,” or “loss,”
are attorney’s fees contemplated. See generally id. §11.14(v),(m),(x) (defining “injury,”
“destruction” and “loss,” respectively).
91
In an action filed pursuant to section 107(f) . . . of CERCLA, . . . a natural
resource trustee who has performed an assessment in accordance with
this rule may recover:
(1)
Damages as determined in accordance with this part and calcu
lated based on injuries occurring from the onset of the release
through the recovery period, less any mitigation of those injuries
by response actions taken or anticipated, plus any increase in
injuries that are reasonably unavoidable as a result of response
actions taken or anticipated;
(2)
The costs of emergency restoration efforts under Sec. 11.21 . . .;
(3)
The reasonable and necessary costs of the assessment, to
include:
i.
The cost of performing the preassessment and Assess
ment Plan phases and the methodologies provided in
subpart D or E of this part; and
ii.
Administrative costs and expenses necessary for, and
incidental to, the assessment, assessment planning,
and restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or
acquisition of equivalent resources planning, and any
restoration, rehabilitation, replacement, and/or acqui
sition of equivalent resources undertaken; and
(4)
Interest on the amounts recoverable as set forth in section 107(a)
of CERCLA.
Id. § 11.15(a).
92
Id.
89
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In response to comments “question[ing] whether attorney’s fees
were recoverable assessment costs,” DOI confirmed that a narrow set
of assessment-related attorney’s fees are a component of the damage
measurement:
The [DOI] believes that trustee officials will generally need
the assistance of an interdisciplinary team of experts when
performing natural resource damage assessments. The
regulations do not restrict recoverable assessment costs to
the expenses of particular types of professionals. The
[DOI’s] regulations provide that recoverable assessment
costs are ‘limited to those costs incurred or anticipated by
the authorized official for, and specifically allocable to, sitespecific efforts taken in the assessment of dam ages.’ 43
C.F.R. 11.60(d)(2). Therefore, if attorneys are involved in
work specifically allocable to an assessment, the resulting
attorneys’ fees are recoverable as assessment costs under
the regulations.93
Such attorney’s fees, however, are limited to those related to site-specific
efforts undertaken to assess natural resource damages, i.e., assessmentrelated attorney’s fees. Remarks made by Representative Jones of North
Carolina during the SARA House debate reference this:
[T]he amendment to Section 107(f) clarifies that sums
recovered by trustees are to be used only to restore the
natural resources. . . . The amendment reflects the restitu
tionary nature of the natural resource regime of CERCLA.
The natural resource regime is not intended to compensate
public treasuries. Nor are recovered damages to be diverted
for general purposes. The purpose of the regime, rather, is
to make whole the natural resources that suffer injury from
releases of hazardous substances. Of course, the trustees
may use such sums to reimburse them for the costs associ
ated with recovering such damages, including the costs of
damage assessments.94

93
94

Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 59 Fed. Reg. 52749, 52754 (Oct. 19, 1994).
132 CONG. REC. 29766 (1986) (statement of Rep. Jones) (emphasis added).
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Proponents of contingency-fee arrangements cite this language as
evidence that Congress intended to permit litigation-related attorney’s
fee recovery when bringing a natural resource damage action.95 Given the
context in which Representative Jones’s remarks were made, however, his
statement is most logically understood as referring to assessment-related
attorney’s fees and other reasonable costs associated with the natural
resource assessment process, not a statement that litigation-related
attorney’s fees are recoverable. To read the last sentence of Representative
Jones’ remark as somehow sanctioning the recovery of litigation-related
attorney’s fees would undermine the full tenor of his preceding statements
(i) emphasizing the use restriction, and (ii) reinforcing the fact that a
natural resource damage recovery must not be used for general purposes
or to compensate the public treasury.96 Indeed, as shown in Part II.B below,
if a damage recovery that did not include litigation-related attorney’s fees
in its measurement is depleted to pay a contingency fee, then the resulting
pool will likely be insufficient to accomplish restoration.97
None of these provisions permit litigation-related attorney’s fees
as a component of the measure of recoverable natural resource damages.
Thus, in the entire text of CERCLA and its implementing regulations,
provision is made for certain categories of recoverable costs, including a
narrow set of assessment-related attorney’s fees, but not for litigationrelated attorney’s fees.
B.

CERCLA’s Underlying Legislative Purpose

As explained above, a strong argument can be advanced that
CERCLA’s statutory language unambiguously reflects that attorney’s
fees are not recoverable when bringing a natural resource damage action.
Because the statutory language is clear, there is no need to analyze the
legislative history of CERCLA’s natural resource damage provisions.98

95

See Kanner & Nagy, supra note 45, at 748.
See 132 CONG. REC. 29766 (1986) (statement of Rep. Jones).
97
See supra note 52.
98
“In a statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the
statute, and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into a statute’s
meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.” Estate of Cowart v.
Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) (citing Demarest v. Manspeaker, 498 U.S.
184, 190 (1991)). See also Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’r v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 108 (1980) (“We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the start
ing point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded
as conclusive.”).
96
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Even assuming arguendo that the express language of CERCLA
is ambiguous regarding the recoverability of litigation-related attorney’s
fees, however, CERCLA’s legislative history reflects that Congress did not
intend to deplete a natural resource damage recovery to pay such fees. As
explained below, CERCLA’s natural resource damage provisions, most par
ticularly the use restriction, are part of a tightly-woven, conscious congres
sional design to further actual restoration of the injured natural resource;
withdrawal of a contingency fee from the damage recovery conflicts with
the congressional intent that the damage award suffice to accomplish, and
in fact apply toward, restoration, replacement or acquisition of an equiv
alent natural resource.99
Congress’s primary purpose in enacting CERCLA’s natural resource
damage provisions was to restore the injured resource (the “Restorative
Purpose”).100 When analyzing whether Congress intended to permit
contingency-fee representation when bringing a public natural resource
damage action, it is critical to understand that Congress intended that
the natural resource damage provisions work to further this Restorative
Purpose.101
This Restorative Purpose was codified into CERCLA’s use restric
102
tion.
A comparison of the use restriction as originally enacted in

99

[I]t is dictated by the plain terms of CERCLA, and the House Committee
on Merchant Marine and Fisheries report indicates that it was part of
a conscious design. That report states that the excess over restoration
costs must be used to acquire the equivalent of the damaged resource–
even though the original resource will eventually be restored.
Ohio v. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d 432, 454 n. 34 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
100
In New Mexico v. General Electric Co., the Tenth Circuit stated that the Restorative
Purpose was the “obvious objective” of Congress in enacting CERCLA’s use restriction.
467 F.3d 1223, 1245-47 (10th Cir. 2006). The D.C. Circuit has made a similar observation:
[CERCLA’s use restriction] obviously reflects Congress’ apparent concern
that its [R]estorative [P]urpose for imposing damages not be construed
as making restoration cost a damages ceiling. But the explicit command
that damages ‘shall not be limited by’ restoration costs also carries in
it an implicit assumption that restoration cost will serve as the basic
measure of damages in many if not most CERCLA cases.
Ohio v. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 445-46. The Congressional Record supports both
circuits. See 126 CONG. REC. 30970 (1980) (statement of Sen. Williams) (“The legislation
will provide for the restoration of natural resources which have been damaged . . . .”).
101
Senator Gravell remarked that “[t]he most important aspect to this bill from a national
viewpoint is the provision of funds for the restoration, rehabilitation and replacement of
natural resources.” 126 CONG. REC. 16, 21377 (1980).
102
See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 4, at 50 (1985) (“It is clear from [the] language [of
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1980 103 and the revised use restriction as amended by SARA 104 is infor
mative. In the revised version, Congress retained the use restriction and
added a provision clarifying that if any damages are recovered that are
in excess of the amount required to fully restore the natural resource, the
additional recovery must be applied to acquire an equivalent resource.105
Senator Bob Smith emphasized the importance of CERCLA’s
Restorative Purpose during a 1995 push for CERCLA reform:

§ 107(f)(1)] that the primary purpose of the resource damage provisions of CERCLA is the
restoration or replacement of natural resources damaged by unlawful releases of hazardous
substances.”).
103
The original 1980 language was:
Sums recovered shall be available for use to restore, rehabilitate, or
acquire the equivalent of such natural resources by the appropriate
agencies of the Federal Government or the State government, but the
measure of such damages shall not be limited by the sums which can
be used to restore or replace such resources.
CERCLA § 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
104
The language as amended by SARA provides as follows:
Sums recovered by the United States Government as trustee under this
subsection shall be retained by the trustee, without further appro
priation, for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of
such natural resources. Sums recovered by a State as trustee under
this subsection shall be available for use only to restore, replace, or
acquire the equivalent of such natural resources by the State. The
measure of damages in any action under subparagraph (C) of sub
section (a) shall not be limited by the sums which can be used to restore
or replace such resources.
CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1) (2000).
105
It is clear from [the] language [of § 107(f)(1)] that the primary purpose of
the resource damage provisions of CERCLA is the restoration or replace
ment of natural resources damaged by unlawful releases of hazardous
substances. . . . [T]he final clause [dealing with use of damages to acquire
a suitable equivalent resource] is necessary because a situation could
arise in which the amount of damages caused by a release of hazardous
substances is in excess of the amount that could realistically or produc
tively be used to restore or replace those resources. That is, the total
amount of damages may include the costs of restoration and the value
of all the lost uses of the damaged resources . . . from the time of the
release up to the time of restoration. Since the damages contemplated by
CERCLA include both, the total amount of damages recoverable would
exceed the restoration costs alone.
The Committee therefore intends [that] any excess funds
recovered shall be used, in such an instance, for the third purpose
spelled out in the language of the amendment, which is to ‘acquire the
equivalent of the damaged resource.’
H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 4 at 50 (1985) (emphasis added).
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Restoring Natural Resources—The sole purpose of [NRD]s is
to provide for the rapid restoration and replacement of signif
icant natural resources that have been damaged by contact
with hazardous materials. Financial compensation from
persons who caused these damages should be used solely for
the purpose of restoring or replacing these resources, and
should not serve as a means of seeking retribution or
punitive damages from potentially responsible parties.106
Moreover, Congress contemplated that the damage recovery would
in fact be sufficient to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of the
injured resource.107 An interpretive case is Ohio v. Department of the
Interior,108 in which the D.C. Circuit held that CERCLA’s implementing
regulations as initially drafted were contrary to CERCLA’s requirement
that damages be at least sufficient to fund the cost of restoration, replace
ment, or acquisition of the equivalent of the damaged resource:
By mandating the use of all damages to restore the injured
resources, Congress underscored in § 107(f)(1) its paramount
restorative purpose for imposing damages at all. It would be
odd indeed for a Congress so insistent that all damages be
spent on restoration to allow a ‘lesser’ measure of damages
than the cost of restoration in the majority of cases. Only
two possible inferences about congressional intent could
explain the anomaly: [e]ither Congress intended trustees
to commence restoration projects only to abandon them for
lack of funds, or Congress expected taxpayers to pick up the
rest of the tab. The first theory is contrary to Congress’
intent to effect a “make-whole” remedy of complete res
toration, and the second is contrary to a basic purpose of
106

141 CONG. REC. 18724 (daily ed. July 13, 1995) (document submitted by Sen. Bob Smith).
Representative Jones remarked that “[t]he purpose of the regime . . . is to make whole
the natural resources that suffer injury from releases of hazardous substances.” 132 CONG.
REC. 29767 (1986). Senator Mitchell stated that “we do not want damage to natural
resources to await the workings of that [common-law tort litigation] process; we want
prompt, full compensation in such cases so we can replant trees in the park . . . .” 126
CONG. REC. 30942 (1980).
108
880 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Ohio v. Department of the Interior, the court was called
upon to address the congressional purpose and legislative history of CERCLA’s natural
resource damage regime when reviewing regulations initially promulgated by DOI that
limited natural resource damages “to ‘the lesser of’ (a) the cost of restoring or replacing the
equivalent of an injured resource, or (b) the lost use value of the resource . . . .” Id. at 438.
107
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the CERCLA natural resource damage provisions—that
polluters bear the costs of their polluting activities. It is far
more logical to presume that Congress intended responsible
parties to be liable for damages in an amount sufficient to
accomplish its restorative aims.109
Congress’s scheme incorporates other provisions to ensure the
Restorative Purpose is accomplished. Congress limited standing to sue for
natural resources damages to a designated public trustee.110 As discussed
in Part II.C below, the trustee is duty bound, as guardian of the public
trust, to safeguard the entrusted funds and apply them in a manner that
comports with CERCLA’s use restriction. Moreover, CERCLA’s settlement
scheme ensures that the Restorative Purpose underlying CERCLA is
accomplished. Section 122(j)(2) limits the government’s ability to provide
a settling party with a covenant not to sue for future natural resource
damage liability unless a PRP “agrees to undertake appropriate actions
necessary to protect and restore the natural resources damaged by such
release or threatened release of hazardous substances.” 111 Additionally,
Congress ensured that there would be no “double recovery” for natural
resource damages.112 Thus, when state trustees bring natural resource
damage suits and improperly deplete the damage recovery to pay a con
tingency fee, other trustees are barred from suing for the same injury to
make up the amount that was depleted and the “make whole” remedy
is destroyed.113

109

Id. at 444-45. The court in Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni also recognized that
CERCLA prefers actual restoration or replacement of injured resources over an award
of monetary damages:
[W]e think the appropriate primary standard for determining damages
in a case such as this is the cost reasonably to be incurred by the
sovereign or its designated agency to restore or rehabilitate the environ
ment in the affected area to its pre-existing condition, or as close thereto
as is feasible without grossly disproportionate expenditures.
628 F.2d 652, 675 (1st Cir. 1980).
110
See CERCLA § 107(f)(1)-(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. §9607(f)(1)-(2)(B) (2000).
111
Id. § 122(j)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9622(j)(2).
112
Id. (“There shall be no double recovery under this chapter for natural resource damages,
including the costs of damage assessment or restoration, rehabilitation, or acquisition for
the same release and natural resource.”).
113
See id.; John Carlucci, supra note 20, at 475 (“CERCLA’s bar on double recovery for
natural resource damages, including assessment costs, offers a strong incentive for trustees
to cooperate with each other on assessments.”).
In 1986, Congress added language to section 107(f)(1) of CERCLA pro
hibiting double recovery for NRDs. This provision limits a trustee from

194

W M . & M ARY E NVTL . L. & P OL ’Y R EV .

[Vol. 32:169

As articulated above, Congress intended that the measure of
damages would be sufficient to accomplish full restoration of the injured
natural resource. Congress did not make litigation-related attorney’s fees
part of the measure of a PRP’s damage liability, and Congress created a
sophisticated recovery scheme designed to ensure that the full recovery
would apply in a manner that is consistent with CERCLA’s use restriction.
A monetary damage award that is diminished by a substantial percentage
to pay a contingency fee where the PRP did not pay the litigation-related
attorney’s fees as part of the measure of damages improperly diverts funds
from the intended goal: actual restoration of the injured resource.
C.

Debunking the Tobacco Analogy: Public Natural Resource
Damage Actions Are Different From Traditional Torts

Although efforts to challenge the legality of contingency-fee based
arrangements in the context of the “Big Tobacco” lawsuits rarely met with
success,114 there are far more compelling reasons to find that contingencyfee arrangements are illegal when bringing a public natural resource
damage action. Advocates of the contingency-fee arrangement, however,
rely heavily on the tobacco line of cases,115 where courts addressed the

seeking CERCLA NRDs for an injury to a natural resource within its
trust when another trustee has already won or settled a CERCLA NRD
claim based upon that same injury.
Patrick H. Zaepfel, The Reauthorization of CERCLA NRDs: A Proposal For a Reformulated
and Rational Federal Program, 8 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 359, 418 (1997); While states have
primary trusteeship over their jurisdictional natural resources, there is concurrent
[f]ederal trusteeship over natural resources aris[ing] out of [f]ederal
responsibilities to manage and protect living and non-living natural
resources . . . . includ[ing] the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) (for marine resources), the U.S. Department
of the Interior (DOI) (for inland fish and wildlife and natural resources
on public lands), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) (for
ground water).
Quarles v. United States ex re. Bureau of Indian Affairs, 2005 WL 278211 at *5 (N.D.
Okla. 2005).
114
See, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Glendening, 709 A.2d 1230 (Md. 1998) (upholding validity
of contingency-fee contract in tobacco litigation); San Francisco v. Philip Morris, Inc., 957
F. Supp. 1130, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
115
See, e.g., Kanner & Nagy, supra note 45, at 750 (analogizing contingency-fee
representation to the “overwhelming weight of authority” upholding such arrangements
in the tobacco context). See generally Plaintiff State of New Mexico’s Response to Defendant
United States’ Motion to Strike Demand for Attorney Fees at 2, New Mexico v. Gen. Elec.
Co., Civ. No. 99-1118 (D.N.M June 5, 2004) (justifying legality of contingency-fee agreement
as necessary “[t]o effectively and efficiently litigate this type of large, complex, toxic tort
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legality of contingency-fee representation by private counsel to assist state
Attorneys General seeking to recoup public money expended to identify
and treat tobacco-related illnesses.116
First, it is inappropriate to automatically address natural resource
damage actions like traditional torts because CERCLA’s natural resource
damage provisions were enacted to counter congressional dissatisfaction
with the litigious and monetary-damage oriented tort system. 117 As
cause of action”). Some of the same attorneys who previously represented states in the
tobacco litigation context have surfaced as special counsel in the natural resource damage
arena using a modified Professional Service Contract modeled after the prototype upheld
in the tobacco litigation:
[I]t appears the contract at Exhibit 1 [i.e., the Professional Service
Contract] was modeled after the contract entered into by the State with
at least one of the five firms here (the Turner Branch Law Firm) in
connection with the State’s litigation against the tobacco industry.
Defendant United States’ Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike Demand for
Attorneys’ Fees at 9, Civ. No. 99-1118 (D.N.M. 2004) (citations omitted).
116
In the late 1990s, numerous states entered into contingency-fee based contractual
arrangements with private attorneys to recoup the states’ costs associated with tobaccorelated health issues. See, e.g., Philip Morris, Inc. v. Glendening, 709 A.2d 1230. Similar
to the natural resource damage arrangement, in the tobacco context “the attorneys general
sought private counsel to represent the [s]tates . . . because the public law offices lacked
the resources necessary to mount what was believed would be a long and expensive legal
battle with the tobacco companies.” Steven K. Berenson, The Duty Defined: Specific
Obligations That Follow From Civil Government Lawyers’ General Duty to Serve the Public
Interest, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 13, 58 (2003). See also, e.g., Glendening, 709 A.2d at 1231
(“[O]ne of the stated purposes for retaining outside counsel was to minimize the state’s
commitment of personnel and financial resources to the lawsuit.”). But see Howard M.
Erichson, Coattail Class Actions: Reflections on Microsoft, Tobacco, and the Mixing of Public
and Private Lawyering in Mass Litigation, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 39 (2000) (contending
that “contingent fee lawyers should not be used to pursue government litigation, even if
the tobacco litigation is viewed in hindsight as a successful use of such arrangements.”).
117
126 CONG. REC. 30942 (1980) (statement of Sen. Mitchell) (“we do not want damage to
natural resources to await the workings of that [common-law tort litigation] process; we
want prompt, full compensation in such cases . . . .”). See also S. REP. NO. 96-848 at 13-14
(“[T]raditional tort law presents substantial barriers to recovery . . . . [C]ompensation
ultimately provided to injured parties is generally inadequate”); 126 CONG. REC. 26347
(1980) (“Existing environmental, common, compensatory, and liability laws are not ade
quate . . . . [They] provide little or no relief for cleanup and compensation.”) (statement
of Rep. Weiss); H.R. REP. NO. 172, pt.1, at 17 (1979) (“[C]ommon law remedies . . . [are]
inadequate to compensate victims . . . in a fair and expeditious manner.”).
[O]ur examination of CERCLA’s legislative history indicates . . .
Congress’ dissatisfaction with the common law provided a central
motivation for enacting CERCLA.
....
[S]upport for the proposition that Congress adopted common-law damage
standards wholesale into CERCLA is slim to nonexistent. . . . The
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explained by one commentator: “[D]espite the continuing validity of state
recovery actions, Superfund was enacted to provide a unifying standard
for natural resource damage recovery in the midst of diverging state
approaches and as a response to congressional dissatisfaction with state
common law remedies.”118 CERCLA’s natural resource damage regime
should be contextually understood as a response to the inadequacies of
traditional tort and not in rote fashion be lumped in with such torts.119
Moreover, unlike traditional tort, CERCLA’s natural resource
damage provisions are part of a complex statutory framework. 120 As dis
cussed in Parts II.A and B above, Congress created an elaborate statutory
system governing natural resource damage recovery designed to ensure
that the recovery is sufficient to cover and in fact applies toward the
Restorative Purpose. This system governs the measure of natural resource
damage recovery and, through a complex interplay involving the totality
of CERCLA’s natural resource damage provisions, governs the use of such
damage recovery to ensure the Restorative Purpose is achieved. With
regard to the measure of damages, Congress specified what damages and
costs may be recovered from a PRP, and, because a PRP’s natural resource
damage liability does not include litigation-related attorney’s fees,121 it is
improper to deduct such fees from a natural resource damage award. Even
where there is excess recovery above the cost of restoration or replace
ment, Congress intended that the excess be spent to acquire an equivalent

legislative history illustrates, however, that a motivating force behind
the CERCLA natural resource damage provisions was Congress’ dis
satisfaction with the common law. Indeed, one wonders why Congress
would have passed a new damage provision at all if it were content with
the common law.
Ohio v. Dep’t of the Interior, 880 F.2d at 446, 455.
118
Michael W. Jones, Natural Resource Damage Assessments for Oil Spills: Policy
Considerations Underlying the Evolution of the Department of the Interior’s Regulations,
1 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 491, 497 (1990).
119
Even though natural resource damage actions are sometimes referred to as environ
mental torts, the general understanding is that the remedy goes beyond traditional torts.
See, e.g., William D. Brighton, Natural Resource Damages Under CERCLA, in COURSE
OF STUDY: HAZARDOUS SUBSTANCES, SITE REMEDIATION AND ENFORCEMENT 331, 333 (ALI
ABA 2006) (“Although a number of commentators and a few district courts have used this
label in describing NRD claims, it is a misnomer. In creating the natural resource damages
cause of action, Congress clearly intended to go beyond common law remedies.”).
120
See Parts II.A and B above.
121
See supra Part II.A.
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resource. 122 Congress created CERCLA’s use restriction to ensure that
damage recoveries are applied toward the Restorative Purpose.123
Yet, in one of the only cases addressing the legality of a
contingency-fee arrangement when prosecuting a natural resource damage
action, the court never addressed the impact of CERCLA’s use restriction,
complex recovery scheme, or the preemptive effect of CERCLA on state
law when it upheld the legality of the contingency agreement based, in
large measure, on an analogy to the tobacco line of cases.124
Courts have invalidated contingency-fee agreements where the
arrangement would violate a statutory provision such as that contained
in CERCLA’s use restriction. For example, in Meredith v. Ieyoub, the
Supreme Court of Louisiana invalidated a contingency-fee contract in the
context of an environmental enforcement action where the contingency
fee would violate a similar statutory provision:
122

CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1); see also supra notes 105-06.
CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1); see also supra note 102.
124
Transcript of Hearing, N.J. Soc’y for Envtl. & Econ. Dev. v. Campbell (NJ SEED), No.
343-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. June 18, 2004) (Sabatino, J.), reprinted in Hyatt, Jr. et al., supra
note 58, at 365 ex.E. In NJ SEED, the Superior Court of New Jersey upheld the legality
of a contingency-fee agreement between special counsel and the State of New Jersey for
purposes of bringing public natural resource damage actions under the New Jersey Spill
Act (New Jersey’s state analog to CERCLA) and common law in a case involving contami
nation in the Lower Passaic River. The court’s ruling draws heavily from the rationale of
Judge Litner in the tobacco context and cites his opinion extensively:
In this regard, the Court concurs with the reasoning of Judge Litner in
sustaining the appointment of special counsel for the State to pursue
Medicaid losses from tobacco companies.
....
In the tobacco matter, Judge Litner noted the public benefit of the
Attorney General taking advantage of the expertise and resources which
would be brought to an extraordinary and non-recurring litigation such
as the tobacco liability matters.
....
So too, here there is a public benefit . . . .
....
The Court disagrees with plaintiffs as did Judge Litner in the tobacco
litigation that the special counsel statute requires an up-front appro
priation for such services.
....
[T]he law of trust would allow counsel for the trust to receive reason
able compensation out of the principal for their services as fiduciaries
in restoring or maximizing the trust property. Again, all of this is in
accord with the reasoning of Judge Litner in approving the contingent
fee for special counsel in the tobacco litigation.
Id. at 110-11, 113, 118, reprinted in Hyatt, supra note 58, at 377-78, 381.
123
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The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous: ‘[a]ll
sums recovered through judgments’ means all sums, not
all sums remaining after the Attorney General has paid his
contingency fee lawyers. If the Legislature had intended to
allow the Attorney General the right to deduct the fees of
contingency fee lawyers from judgments or settlements in
environmental cases before paying the remainder into the
state treasury, surely it would not have clearly directed
that ‘all sums recovered’ be paid into the state treasury.125

125

Meredith v. Ieyoub, 700 So. 2d 478, 482 (La. 1997). States have invalidated the use of
contingency-fee contracts in other contexts as well. See Ieyoub v. W.R. Grace & Co.Conn., 708 So. 2d 1227, 1229 (La. App. 3 Cir. 1998) (following the reasoning of Meredith,
the court invalidated a contingency-fee contract between the Attorney General and a
private law firm handling civil claims against an asbestos manufacturer over placement
of asbestos in government buildings); People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court (Ebel), 705
P.2d 347, 348 (Cal. 1985) (invalidating contingency-fee agreement between a city govern
ment and a private attorney hired to bring nuisance abatement actions). In North Dakota
v. Hagerty, the court upheld the legality of a contingency-fee agreement between the State
and private attorneys for the purpose of bringing asbestos claims: “In view of th[e] longstanding acceptance of contingent fee arrangements and in view of the historical authority
of the Attorney General, we believe she has the authority to employ special assistants
attorneys general on a contingent fee agreement unless such agreements are specifically
prohibited by statute.” 580 N.W.2d 139, 148 (N.D. 1998) (emphasis added). In Hagerty, there
was no statutory provision akin to CERCLA’s use restriction, but the court’s rationale
suggests that had there been such a statutory restriction, the court would have invalidated
the contingency-fee agreement. In Philip Morris Inc. v. Glendening, the court was per
suaded by the fact that “the gross recovery from the tobacco litigation is not ‘State’ or
‘public’ money subject to legislative appropriation until the State has fulfilled its obli
gation under the Contract, collected the recovery, net of the contingency fee and litigation
expenses, and deposited the funds into the State Treasury,” and that “there is a strong
indication that the Legislature did not intend to impose strict conditions under which
assistant counsel may be specially employed.” 957 F. Supp 1130, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
And, San Francisco v. Philip Morris Inc., the court upheld a contingency-fee contract in
the tobacco context, persuaded by what it called a “meaningful distinction” between classictort tobacco suits, in which contingency fees are permissible, and “public” tort actions, such
as that at issue in People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court, in which the court invalidated
a contingency fee contract:
The [c]ourt also finds that the civil tort nature of this action meaningfully
distinguishes it from Clancy. This lawsuit, which is basically a fraud
action, does not raise concerns analogous to those in the public nui
sance or eminent domain contexts discussed in Clancy. Plaintiff’s role
in this suit is that of a tort victim, rather than a sovereign seeking to
vindicate the rights of its residents or exercising governmental powers.
957 F. Supp 1130, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (discussing People ex rel. Clancy v. Superior Court
(Ebel), 705 P.2d 347, 348 (Cal. 1985)) (emphasis added). Conversely, the opposite is true
in the natural resource damage situation and thus cases like Glendening and San Francisco
have no comparable analogy to natural resource damage actions. First, unlike sums
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This analysis is consistent with case law addressing contingency
fees in the context of New York’s “Big Tobacco” lawsuits. In New York v.
Philip Morris Inc., the court upheld a contingency-fee arrangement
because, inter alia, “any fee award would come solely out of defendant
tobacco companies’ pockets and would not affect the State’s recovery in
any fashion.”126 Thus the court was persuaded by the fact that the
tobacco companies paid the State’s private attorney’s continency fee over
and above the damage measure.
Third, unlike traditional torts, natural resource damage actions
are brought by a formal public trustee who is obligated to safeguard and
properly apply the entrusted funds.127 As discussed below, the trustee acts
on behalf of the public and, as guardian of the public trust, has a con
comitant duty to safeguard natural resource damage funds to ensure that
they are in fact applied toward the Restorative Purpose.
The trustee has a statutory duty under CERCLA, and a common
law duty rooted in the public trust and parens patriae doctrines, to restore,
where possible, injured natural resources. Statutorily, the trustee must
act to (1) assess the damage to natural resources, (2) recover such damages
from PRPs, and (3) apply any recovery in a manner that comports with
the use restriction.128 The trustee, as “the authorized representative,” 129
acts “on behalf of the public” with respect to the trust disposition.130 This
duty comports with CERCLA’s use restriction: “[s]ums recovered by a . . .
trustee . . . shall be available for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the
equivalent of such natural resources.” 131 Although any person is entitled
to bring a cost recovery action, “[o]nly those Federal, State, and Indian
tribe officials designated as natural resource trustees may recover natural
resource damages.” 132

recovered for tobacco claims, “sums recovered” for natural resource damage claims are
by definition public funds and there is an express mandate about how that recovery is
spent which would be undermined by the payment of the fee. See CERCLA § 107(f)(1),
42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1); id. § 107 (f)(2)(A)-(B), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(A)-(B). Second, unlike
traditional torts, natural resource damage actions are public in nature and they fall
squarely into the category of cases where a sovereign seeks to vindicate the rights of its
residents or exercise governmental powers.
126
New York v. Philip Morris, Inc., 308 A.D.2d 57, 66 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003) (emphasis
added).
127
CERCLA § 107(f), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (2000).
128
See id.
129
Id. § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
130
Id. § 107(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2).
131
Id. § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).
132
Natural Resource Damage Assessments, Type A Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 6012, 6013
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Under the public trust and parens patriae doctrines which under
pin the trustee’s standing to sue for natural resource damage in state,
territorial and common law, the trustee has the same duty. The public
trust doctrine recognizes that the government holds certain lands in trust
for the benefit of the public.133 “As trustee, the government has a ‘duty to
manage trust resources in a manner that is consistent with the trust.’
When that trust is violated, suit can be brought to recover damages to the
resources.” 134 Similarly, under the authority of parens patriae, or “parent
of the country,” a state has standing to sue to prevent or repair harm to
its quasi-sovereign interests.135
By entrusting the action to a public trustee, Congress added a
procedural safeguard to CERCLA to ensure the recovery would be applied
to achieve the Restorative Purpose. The trustee serves as guardian of the
public’s trust and must protect the trust corpus to ensure it is properly
applied.136 The Ninth Circuit recognized this protective check on recovery
in Alaska Sport Fishing Association v. Exxon Corp.:
Given the [R]estorative [P]urposes behind the CW A and
CERCLA, it simply makes no sense to reserve a portion of
lost-use damages for recovery by private parties. Unlike
trustees, private parties are not bound to use recovered sums
for the restoration of natural resources, or the acquisition
of equivalent resources.137

(Feb. 9, 2000) (codified at 43 C.F.R. pt. 11); accord CERCLA § 107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. §
9607(f)(1).
133
Murray et al., supra note 12, at 420-21.
134
Id. at 421 (quoting Cynthia Carlson, Making CERCLA Natural Resource Damage
Regulations Work: The Use of the Public Trust Doctrine and Other State Remedies, 18
Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,299, 10,302 (Aug. 1988)).
135
See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 607 (1982) (“[A] State has
a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being—both physical and economic—of
its residents in general.”); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 264-66 (1972).
136
See generally Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 676 (1st Cir. 1980)
(upholding district court’s rejection of trustee’s “draconian” damage assessment plan
because it “was not a step that a reasonable trustee of the natural environment would be
expected to take as a means of protecting the corpus of the trust.”).
137
Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n. v. Exxon Corp, 34 F.3d 769, 772 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis
added). In Alaska Sport, the plaintiff, an association of sport fisherman, sought recovery
of damages for the “lost-use” of fisheries due to the Exxon-Valdez oil spill. Id. at 769-70.
The court ruled that the plaintiff, a private party, had no authority under the Clean Water
Act or CERCLA to seek such damages when the trustee, who is duty-bound to apply the
recovery in a manner that comports with the use restriction, had already asserted natural
resource damage claims. Id. at 770, 772. The D.C. Circuit followed this reasoning in
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Congress believed it protected the public’s recovery by putting the
trust into the hands of a designated trustee who is bound to, and in fact
would, follow the use restriction. As Murray and his co-authors explain:
NRD trustees have access to very large amounts of money,
which only they, as government trustees, have standing to
collect. Additionally, the trustees, as government officials,
are aware of other environmental needs within the state or
department they represent as well as the wishes of other
entities that have an interest in seeing the recovered funds
spent a certain way. Thus, a potential conflict of interest is
created by the opportunity for trustees (1) to collect funds
from particular sites and use those funds for the benefit of
another environmental need or (2) to increase the govern
ment coffers . . . . Congress obviously foresaw this conflict
and incorporated a provision that it evidently thought would
prevent abuse. Section 107(f)(1) of CERCLA provides that
any recovery by the trustee shall be retained by the trustee
‘for use only to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of
[damaged] natural resources.’138
As discussed above, there are substantial differences between
natural resource damage actions, which are public actions brought by
statutorily-designated trustees who are obligated to apply all sums recov
ered toward restoration of the natural resources, and traditional torts.139
As such, it is inappropriate to draw an automatic analogy to the use of
special contingency-fee counsel relationships in other tort contexts.

Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior. “Persuaded in part by the Ninth
Circuit’s reasoning in Alaska Sport Fishing Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 34 F.3d 769 (9th Cir.
1994),” the court reiterated the Restorative Purpose underlying CERCLA and “the correlative
need to funnel damage recovery through public trustees rather than to private litigants.”
Kennecott Utah Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 88 F.3d 1191, 1228 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
138
Murray et al., supra note 12, at 424-25 (emphasis added).
139
These same arguments apply to counter another position advanced to justify the
contingency-fee arrangement. Proponents argue that Congress intended to create a trust
and trustees may, under traditional trust law, recoup the reasonable costs incurred to create
or protect the trust corpus. Kanner & Nagy, supra note 45, at 746-47. Again, CERCLA estab
lished a statutory framework to counteract congressional dissatisfaction with traditional
common law doctrine, did not include litigation-related attorney’s fees in a damage mea
surement calculated to fully address the public’s natural resource damage injury, and
ensured that the damage recovery funnel through a designated trustee who is obligated to
use the damage recovery only to restore, replace, or acquire an equivalent resource. Using
traditional trust doctrine to permit a trustee to deplete a damage recovery to pay a con
tingency fee thwarts Congress’s natural resource damage scheme.
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D.
CERCLA’s
Preemptive
Effect
on State, Territorial or Common
Natural
Resource
Damage
Laws
Trustees frequently bring natural resource damage claims under
broad state, territorial and/or common laws that do not contain use re
strictions similar to that in CERCLA.140 This situation raises the issue
of whether a trustee may avoid CERCLA’s use restriction by paying the
contingency fee from a damage recovery under one of these broader legal
theories. As explained below, however, the stronger argument is that any
such state, territorial or common law that (1) provides for a natural re
source damage recovery and does not contain a use restriction, and/or
(2) does not include litigation-related attorney’s fees as part of the damage
measurement, is in conflict with CERCLA’s carefully structured natural
resource regime and is consequently preempted.141
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution 142
preempts state laws that “interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of
[C]ongress, made in pursuance of the [C]onstitution.” 143 Federal laws can
preempt state laws either explicitly or by implication. 144 Express preemp
tion occurs when the statutory language reflects a congressional intent to
displace state law.145 A federal law implicitly preempts state laws if (i) the
federal regulation so occupies the field that Congress must have intended
to leave no room for state laws (“field preemption”),146 or (ii) there is an
actual conflict between state and federal law such that “it is impossible to
comply with both . . . or the state law stands as an obstacle to the accom
plishment of Congress’s objectives” (“conflict preemption”).147
It has been held that CERCLA is not so comprehensive as to
expressly preempt state environmental laws or implicitly work field
140

See, e.g., New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1236 (10th Cir. 2006); Comm’r
of the Dep’t of Planning & Natural Res., Dean C. Plaskett v. Esso Standard Oil, S.A., No.
1:98-cv-00206 (D.V.I. 1998).
141
Conversely, any state, territorial or common natural resource damage law that (1) pro
vides for a measure of damages akin to that in CERCLA, (2) restricts the trustee’s use
of the funds to restoration, replacement or acquisition of an equivalent resource, and
(3) includes litigation-related attorney’s fees as an additional component of the damage
measurement, is not preempted by CERCLA.
142
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
143
United States v. Denver, 100 F.3d 1509, 1512 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Wisconsin Pub.
Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604 (1991) (alternation in original)).
144
Barnett Bank of Marion County N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 31 (1996).
145
See United States v. Denver, 100 F.3d at 1512.
146
Id.
147
Id.; accord Int’l Paper v. Oullette, 479 U.S. 481, 491-92 (1987).
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preemption.148 CERCLA can, however, preempt state and common environ
mental laws under a theory of conflict preemption.149
Congressional intent is the determinative factor when analyzing
whether federal law preempts state law. 150 Congressional intent is ascer
tained “by examining the statutory language and the structure and purpose
of the statute.” 151
In New Mexico v. General Electric Co., the Tenth Circuit held that
CERCLA’s natural resource damage provisions preempted New Mexico’s
attempts to seek an unrestricted monetary natural resource damage award
under state and common law.152 “The restrictions on the use of NRDs in

148

See, e.g., Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 426 (2d Cir. 1998); United States v.
Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1579 (10th Cir. 1993).
149
Courts have held that CERCLA preempts conflicting state and common laws relating
to, inter alia, statutes of limitations, restitution, and indemnity. See O’Connor v. Boeing
N. Am., Inc., 311 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that discovery-based statute of
limitations under state law is expressly preempted by CERCLA); Bedford Affiliates, 156
F.3d at 427 (holding that state and common law restitution and indemnification actions
created an actual conflict with CERCLA’s “carefully crafted settlement system” and were
therefore preempted); United States v. Denver, 100 F.3d at 1512-13 (holding that CERCLA
preempts city and county zoning ordinance prohibiting maintenance of hazardous waste
in areas zoned for industrial use because it stood as an obstacle to CERCLA’s objectives);
New York v. Moulds Holding Corp., 196 F. Supp. 2d 210, 219 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (holding that
state law claims for restitution, unjust enrichment, subrogation and indemnification are
preempted by section 107 of CERCLA). In order to demonstrate that an actual conflict exists,
the claimant must demonstrate that “compliance with both federal and state regulations
is a physical impossibility” or that “the state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplish
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987) (quoting Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc.
v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963) and Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
150
Manor Care, Inc. v. Yaskin, 950 F.2d 122, 125 (D.N.J. 1991) (“Congressional intent
determines whether state action is preempted by federal law.”).
151
Id.
152
467 F.3d 1223, 1247 (10th Cir. 2006). New Mexico first filed a claim in federal district
court for natural resource damages under CERCLA, and filed a separate lawsuit in state
court alleging various state and common law natural resource damage claims, including
trespass, public nuisance and negligence. Id. at 1236. The action was removed to federal
court and consolidated with the federal action. Id. After a period of extensive discovery,
the Attorney General filed “(1) a motion to dismiss all CERCLA claims and federal defen
dants from the NRD lawsuit, and (2) a motion to remand the remaining state law claims
to state court.” Id. at 1237. The court granted the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss, but
denied the motion to remand. Thus, all that remained were state and common law claims
in federal court. Although the court in New Mexico v. General Electric Co. did not go so
far as to hold that New Mexico’s public nuisance and negligence theories were entirely
preempted, the court held that such claims were preempted to the extent the state sought
to obtain an unrestricted monetary damage award, which “cannot withstand CERCLA’s
comprehensive NRD scheme.” Id. at 1247-48.
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§ 9607(f)(1) represent Congress’s considered judgment as to the best
method of serving the public interest in addressing the cleanup of haz
ardous waste. We cannot endorse any state law suit that seeks to under
mine that judgment.” 153 After explaining that the “obvious objective” of
CERCLA’s natural resource damage provisions was to restore or replace
the injured resource, the court held:
Consistent with this objective, we hold CERCLA’s compre
hensive NRD scheme preempts any state remedy designed
to achieve something other than the restoration, replace
ment, or acquisition of the equivalent of a contaminated
natural resource.154
Significantly, the court’s analysis rejects any trust disposition, in
cluding diminishing a natural resource damage recovery to pay attorney
fees, that goes toward anything other than the Restorative Purpose:
Finally, in a case where an NRD claim is premised upon
both CERCLA and state law, a portion of the recovery if
earmarked for the state law claims could be used for some
thing other (for example, attorney fees) than to restore or
replace the injured resource. The remainder of the NRD
recovery . . . would then be insufficient to restore or replace
such resource. Clearly, permitting the State to use an NRD
recovery, which it would hold in trust, for som e purpose
other than to “restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of”
the injured groundwater would undercut Congress’s policy
objectives in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(1).155
The court further rejected the state’s argument that CERCLA’s
savings clauses 156 support the state’s ability to pursue an unrestricted
monetary award under state and common law:
153

Id. at 1247.
Id.
155
Id. at 1248 (emphasis added).
156
CERCLA contains the following savings provisions: (I) “[n]othing in this chapter shall
be construed or interpreted as preempting any State from imposing any additional liability
or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous substances within such State,”
CERCLA § 114(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9614(a) (2000); and (ii) “[n]othing in this chapter shall affect
or modify in any way the obligations or liabilities of any person under other Federal or
State law, including common law, with respect to releases of hazardous substances or other
pollutants or contaminants,” id § 302(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9652(d).
154
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[W]e reach this conclusion notwithstanding CERCLA’s
saving clauses because we do not believe Congress in
tended to undermine CERCLA’s carefully crafted NRD
scheme through these savings clauses.
....
An interpretation of the saving clauses that preserved the
state’s NRD claim for money damages in its original form
would seriously disrupt CERCLA’s principle aim of cleaning
up hazardous waste.157
This preemption argument finds additional support in an amicus
curiae brief submitted by the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
on a related issue involving whether the Government of the Virgin Islands
could lawfully use a natural resource damage recovery relating to ground
water injury—and thus earmarked to restore the groundwater resource—
to purchase a stretch of beach on a different part of St. Thomas.158
The Government of the Virgin Islands’ request was challenged by
Intervenor Britain H. Bryant on the ground that, in accordance with
CERCLA’s use restriction, the purchase would effect an unlawful diversion
of natural resource damage funds from a settlement that could lawfully
only go toward restoration, replacement, or acquisition of a groundwater
resource.159 The Virgin Islands’ trustee asserted that because he settled
territorial and common law claims in addition to the CERCLA claim, and
because there is no parallel restriction under territorial law or common
law that the trustee only apply the funds to restore, replace, or acquire
the equivalent of the damaged resource, the trustee was entitled to avoid
CERCLA’s use restriction by diverting the funds under the broader
authority of territorial or common law.160
Although DOJ authored the brief to respond to a different issue
than the legality of contingency fees, the broad wording of the brief

157

New Mexico v. Gen. Elec. Co., 467 F.3d at 1247-48. See also Geier v. Am. Honda Motor
Co., 529 U.S. 861, 872-74 (2000) (stating that the court will not “read general ‘saving’ pro
visions to tolerate actual conflict” between federal and state laws); AT & T v. Cent. Office
Tel., Inc., 524 U.S. 214, 227-28 (1998) (holding that a savings clause is not intended to
nullify specific provisions of the statute that contains it).
158
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae Regarding Federal Preemption of
Territorial Law Regarding Use of Natural Resource Damage Recovery, Comm’r of the
Dep’t of Planning & Natural Res., Dean C. Plaskett v. Esso Standard Oil, S.A., No. 1:98
cv-00206-RLF (D.V.I. Mar. 1, 2005).
159
Id. at 4.
160
Id. at 6.
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suggests that the United States’ position applies with equal force to the
contingency-fee context:
[T]erritorial law, to the extent it allows [the trustee] to use
its NRD trust money for anything other than to restore,
replace or acquire the equivalent of the injured natural
resources . . . , stands as an obstacle to accomplishment of
the Congressional objective to restore natural resources,
and therefore is preempted by CERCLA.161
DOJ explained that CERCLA’s use restriction “lies at the heart of
CERCLA’s NRD scheme, because it ensures that the trustees designated
to act on behalf of the public in fact serve the public’s collective, long-term
interests in preserving and rebuilding our natural heritage.” 162 The issue
was never judicially resolved because the Trustee of the Virgin Islands
withdrew his motion to divert the natural resource damage recovery after
the United States filed its amicus brief.163
The congressional design of CERCLA’s carefully-crafted natural
resource damage scheme is undermined if a contingency fee is paid from
a natural resource damage recovery.164 Thus, state, territorial and common
laws that provide for natural resource damages, do not include litigationrelated attorney’s fees in the measure of damages, and do not contain a par
allel to CERCLA’s use restriction, are in conflict with, and consequently
preempted by, CERCLA.
III.

A P ROPOSAL FOR L EGISLATIVE R EFORM

The history of the floundering natural resource damage cause of
action reflects that there is a void in CERCLA’s natural resource damage
provisions. As shown above, the current attempt to facilitate such claims
by outsourcing them to contingency-fee attorneys illegally disrupts the con
gressional scheme. As a result, millions of public dollars are diverted from

161

Id. at 4.
Id. at 2.
163
See Notice of Withdrawal of Plaintiff’s Motion to Provide Information to Court Regarding
the Proposed Disbursement of Settlement Monies, and Withdrawal of Plaintiff’s Appeal
of October 8, 2004 Order Granting Motion of Britain H. Bryant to Intervene, Comm’r of
the Dep’t of Planning & Natural Res., Dean C. Plaskett v. Esso Standard Oil, S.A., No.
1:98-cv-00206-RLF (D.V.I. Mar. 1, 2005).
164
See supra Parts II.A and B.
162
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natural resource restoration to instead pay an attorney’s fee. Congress
meant for natural resource damage actions to take place, however.
Congress’s natural resource damage scheme is otherwise well-structured,
but this history demonstrates that CERCLA lacks the appropriate financial
incentives to enable governments to bring these claims.
What is needed to resolve this dilemma is legislative reform to
permit the recovery of the government’s reasonable litigation-related
attorney’s fees and costs when prosecuting CERCLA natural resource
damage actions. This will enable governments to bring natural resource
damage claims and to lawfully recoup the litigation expense from the
natural resource damage award.
At the same time, Congress should clarify its position on whether
contingency-fee representation is appropriate when governments prosecute
natural resource damage claims.165 Although a comprehensive analysis of
the policy arguments for and against contingency-fee representation is
beyond the scope of this article, there are substantial issues on both sides
of the debate.166 Proponents of the arrangement argue that it furthers
public policy because: (i) there are high costs and litigation risks associated
with such actions; (ii) contingency-fee arrangements are monetarily more
efficient than hourly or in-house fees; (iii) contingency-fee arrangements
avoid the staffing shortages that affect some resource-challenged state
Attorneys General’s offices; (iv) contingency-fee attorneys are monitored

165

If Congress amends CERCLA to provide for the recovery of the government’s reason
able litigation costs, it is likely that such actions would be prosecuted by the appropriate
Attorney General’s office without resort to special counsel. It is possible, however, that
governments might still outsource the action to contingency-fee counsel. Thus, Congress
should provide guidance about whether contingency-fee arrangements are appropriate.
166
It is important to distinguish between arguments based on public policy, which inform
whether as a matter of policy attorney’s fees should be recoverable when prosecuting a
natural resource damage action, from arguments based on CERCLA’s express language and
underlying legislative intent, which inform whether attorney’s fees are in fact recoverable.
As explained by the Supreme Court in Alyeska:
We do not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the ‘American Rule’
with respect to the allowance of attorneys’ fees. It has been criticized in
recent years, and courts have been urged to find exceptions to it. It is
also apparent from our national experience that the encouragement of
private action to implement public policy has been viewed as desirable
in a variety of circumstances. But the rule followed in our courts with
respect to attorneys’ fees has survived. It is deeply rooted in our history
and in congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade the legislature’s
province by redistributing litigation costs . . . .
421 U.S. 240, 270-71 (1975) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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by the state Attorney General to avoid any concerns attendant to the
contingency-fee counsel’s financial stake in the outcome; (v) state Attorney
Generals typically do not specialize in complex natural resource damage
litigation; and (vi) lawyers paid on an hourly basis have an incentive to
bring frivolous claims.167
Conversely, there are substantial policy arguments against
contingency-fee arrangements when prosecuting natural resource damage
actions. First, because of the public nature of a natural resource damage
action, attorneys with a direct financial stake in the outcome of the liti
gation should perhaps not be positioned to prosecute it.168 If a PRP proposes
a non-monetary settlement that benefits the public and furthers resto
ration of the injured resource, the contingency-fee attorney has an incen
tive to reject it in favor of a monetary damage award. 169 Thus, while the
attorney’s personal incentive to maximize monetary recovery often overlaps
with the public good in other contingency-fee contexts, it conflicts with
CERCLA’s goal of encouraging actual restoration of the injured resource.170
Second, while permitting contingency-fee representation in the
arena of public natural resource damage actions might enable trustees
to bring actions that otherwise would not have been pursued, it also works
the more insidious effect of avoiding the political checks and balances
that come along with “budget-based political accountability.” 171 Professor
Howard M. Erichson argues that although contingency fees may allow
government to bring litigation it might not otherwise have had the fiscal
ability to prosecute,

167

Kanner & Nagy, supra note 45, at 745-50.
Erichson, supra note 116, at 36 (“The primary reason contingent fee arrangements
should not be used for government lawsuits is that government legal authority should not
be given to someone with a direct financial stake in a matter.”); see also David Edward
Dahlquist, Inherent Conflict: A Case Against the Use of Contingency Fees by Special
Assistants in Quasi-Governmental Prosecutorial Roles, 50 DEPAUL L. REV. 743, 747 (2000)
(“Based on the idea that the Attorneys General are the representatives of the people,
allowing an employee of the office to receive a great windfall as a result of his duty to the
state, is in conflict with the purpose of the office.”).
169
Imagine a situation involving damage to a groundwater resource where a PRP offers to
settle the claim by funding an alternative water source such as the construction of a public
water treatment facility. Even where such a creative settlement comports with CERCLA’s
use restriction, furthers the Restorative Purpose of CERCLA and benefits the public, an
attorney paid on contingency will have an incentive to reject it in favor of a monetary award.
170
See CERCLA §107(f)(1), 42 U.S.C. §9607(f)(1) (2000).
171
Erichson, supra note 116, at 39.

168
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[t]he problem is that government checks and balances
depend largely on purse-strings, and contingent fees make
those purse-strings disappear or at least put the strings
beyond the reach of the legislative branch. . . . Contingent
fees allow the [A]ttorney [G]eneral’s office to pursue liti
gation without worrying about the budget, and thus without
the immediacy of budget-based political accountability.172
Third, “[u]nlike private attorneys, the Attorneys General are . . .
instilled with a higher public duty and obligation.” 173 One commentator
describes a heightened “public interest serving role” on the part of attor
neys who represent the government.174 Political cronyism, however, often
determines who gets appointed as special counsel.175 Political contribu
tions and personal connections have all factored into the decision-making
process of selecting special counsel.176 This combines to erode confidence
in the public officials tasked to safeguard the public’s trust.
Fourth, because governments will be positioned to recoup their
reasonable litigation-related fees and costs, the classic justification of neces
sity due to underfunded and understaffed Attorney General offices would
no longer be compelling.177 Moreover, court tolerance is waning for these

172

Id. See also Margaret A. Little, A Most Dangerous Indiscretion: The Legal, Economic,
and Political Legacy of the Governments’ Tobacco Litigation, 33 CONN. L. REV. 1143, 1152
(2001) (“Th[e] requirement that all funds belong to the state and must be deposited in the
treasury is one of two complementary governing principles implicit in our state and federal
constitutional order, the other being the prohibition of any expenditure of any public money
without legislative authorization.”).
173
Dahlquist, supra note 168, at 743-44.
174
Berenson, supra note 116, at 13 (quoting Steven K. Berenson, Public Lawyers, Private
Values: Can, Should, and Will Government Lawyers Serve the Public Interest?, 41 B.C.L.
REV. 789, 790 (2000)).
175
Dahlquist, supra note 168, at 777-78; see also Gray, supra note 1, at 6 (recognizing
contingency-fee arrangements have been criticized for creating “serious conflicts of interest
for State attorneys general who may have received large campaign contributions from the
same private attorneys.”); Little, supra note 172, at 1151 & n.41 (noting commentators who
have “focused on the pattern of attorneys general hiring their own former law firms or close
cronies” as special counsel).
176
See supra note 175.
177
Indeed, even without formal legislative reform, more of a financial commitment to fund
the government’s ability to bring such claims appears to have already begun. See, e.g.,
Hyatt et al., supra note 58 at 285 (“Overall, the devotion of resources, combined with
better organization within the States and coordination with other States seem to indicate
that State NRD programs are becoming more efficient.”). Furthermore, the underlying
assumption that states, territories and tribes are unable to bring such action in the first
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types of arguments. In New Mexico v. General Electric Co., the Tenth
Circuit recognized, but was not persuaded by, the argument that the vast
costs associated with the natural resource damage assessment process
serve as a financial bar to the trustee’s ability to bring such actions.178
Fifth, there is conflicting information regarding whether
contingency-fee representation, when translated into an hourly figure,
is reasonable. According to Professor Lester Brickman:
Under both ethical codes and fiduciary principles, fees must
be ‘reasonable.’ Contingency fees are designed to—and do—
yield higher effective hourly rates than do hourly rate fees
to reflect the risks that lawyers bear. These higher rates of
return, however, are justified under ethical codes and fidu
ciary principles only if they are commensurate with the
risks assumed by lawyers of nonrecovery or low recovery.
....

instance is not always true. Most states have functional environmental enforcement pro
grams staffed with trained, specialty attorneys. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY’S MANUAL 5-12.523, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading
_room/usam/title5/12menv.htm#5-12.523 (last visited Oct. 25, 2007) (Coordination with
State Programs).
178
We are well aware that NRD assessment is a costly proposition. Accord
ing to two commentators, after its 1986 amendments, CERCLA ‘cast
trustees adrift to finance their own damage assessment before filing
claims against polluters—a costly proposition, given that damage assess
ments typically cost millions of dollars. This lack of funding has created a
virtually insurmountable obstacle considering that agency budgets have
historically authorized little or no funding for NRD assessments.’ Still,
given the [Attorney General’s] original multi-billion dollar claim
against GE and ACF, a few million dollars seems not so significant a
cost to take advantage of CERCLA’s rebuttable presumption of NRDs,
especially where the reasonable costs of assessment are recoverable
from PRPs.
New Mexico v. General Elec. Co., 467 F.3d 1223, 1242 n.28 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal
citations omitted) (emphasis added). Even with the resources of special counsel, it seems
that special counsel does not always invest in a formal natural resource damage assess
ment to accord it the statutory rebuttable presumption. See AMY W. ANDO ET AL.,ILL. DEP’T
OF NATURAL RES., NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE ASSESSMENT: METHODS AND CASES (2004),
available at www.uluc.edu/main_sections/info_services/library_docs/RR/RR-108.pdf. Ando
and her co-authors evaluated how state agencies with natural resource damage programs
chose to conduct damage assessments, and determined that out of 88 sample cases, a
natural resource damage assessment on the entire injury had been performed in only 33
cases. Id. at 10. Moreover, trustees applied “a range of assessment methods,” from a habitat
equivalency analysis to a more limited “tool of the trustee’s own design.” Id.
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By use of a zero-based accounting system under which tort
lawyers apply standard contingent-fee rates to the entire
recovery obtained in tort cases rather than just to the com
ponent of the recovery that represents the value that they
have added to claims, contingent-fee lawyers . . . obtain
inordinately high rates of return, not infrequently amount
ing to thousands and even tens of thousands of dollars an
hour. Often these enormous fees are obtained in cases where
lawyers bear no meaningful risk of low or no recovery.179
Because contingency-fee agreements illegally drain the public’s
natural resource damage recovery to pay an attorney’s fee, pending legis
lative reform, the current use of such arrangements must cease. Such
actions must be prosecuted by either salaried government counsel or,
alternatively, special counsel paid a comparable salary or a reasonable
fee,180 drawn from a lawful government appropriation.

179
Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data
and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH. U. L. Q. 653, 655-60 (2003) (citations omitted). But
see generally Herbert M. Kritzer, Advocacy and Rhetoric vs. Scholarship and Evidence
in the Debate over Contingency Fees: A Reply to Professor Brickman, 82 Wash. U. L. Q.
477 (2004). Although a comprehensive study of whether contingency fees are “reasonable”
when bringing public natural resource damage actions is beyond the scope of this article,
it matters little to the author’s conclusion that litigation-related attorney’s fees cannot be
deducted from a natural resource damage recovery. To the extent there is an automatic
assumption, however, that contingency fees are “reasonable,” it is important to understand
that there is conflicting data on the subject and those seeking to analyze the data should
be aware of the debate.
180
See Dahlquist, supra note 168, at 745-46 (“Traditionally, the compensation for the
services of a Special Assistant was based on an amount comparable to the salary of full
time Assistant Attorneys General, or a comparable ‘reasonable’ hourly amount.”). Contrast,
by way of example, the $92,000 hourly recovery of some of the attorneys handling the
tobacco litigation on contingency. Id. at 777.

